SOUTH AFRICAN



Section/division Accident and Incident Investigations Division Form Number: CA 12-57

LIMITED OCCURRENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT – FINAL

Referenc e Number	CA18/2/3/10354												
Classification Accid		dent		Date	16、	July 20	uly 2023		•	Time	1206Z		
Type of Op	era	tion	Private	e (Part	91)								
Location													
Place of Departure	Ra		Wheatlands, tein, Gauteng						dfc	31, Wheatlands, dfontein, Gauteng ^r ince			
Place of Occurrence	Plo	ot 31 ir	n Wheat	lands,	Randfo	ontein,	Gaut	eng Pr	ovince				
GPS Co- ordinates	Latitude		26° 1	26° 10' 41.06" S		Longit	tude	27° 3	37' 20.7	1" E	Elevation		5 735 feet
Aircraft Information													
Registratior)		ZS-RT	N									
Make; Model; S/N Robinson; R44 Raven I (Serial Number: 0873)													
Damage to Aircraft		Substantial			Total Aircraft Hours			č	8 066.2				
Pilot-in-command													
Туре		lot Licence (PPL)		Gen	der	er Male				Age	43		
Licence Valid	No		Total	Hours	s 491.7		Total Hours		Hours	on Type		491.7	
Total Hours 30 Days 0.1			0.1		Total Flying			on Type Past 90 Days			5.9		
People On-board			1+3	Injurie		es	0	Fatalities 0		C	Other (on ground) 0		
What Happened													
On Monday	aft	ernoon	at app	roxima	telv 12	00Z. a	pilot	and th	ree pa	ssenae	ers	on-boar	d a Robinson

On Monday afternoon at approximately 1200Z, a pilot and three passengers on-board a Robinson helicopter R44 Raven I with registration ZS-RTN were involved in an accident after take-off from Plot 31 in Wheatlands, Randfontein, Gauteng province. The flight was conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) by day and under the provisions of Part 91 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011 as amended.

According to the pilot, he conducted a pre-flight inspection with no anomalies noted. Thereafter, he boarded the helicopter with the three passengers with the intention to conduct a private flight in the vicinity. After engine start, the pilot initially conducted a hover to complete the power check procedure. Thereafter, he initiated a forward transition to continue with the flight. However, the helicopter experienced low rotor revolutions per minute (RPM), followed by the warning horn. Soon after, the helicopter sank and impacted the ground hard with the left skid gear, which broke off. The helicopter came to a stop a few metres from the first contact point. The pilot turned off the master switch and requested the passengers to disembark from the helicopter. The helicopter sustained damage to the left skid gear and the vertical tail fin, which was substantial. No injuries were reported during the accident.

Following the occurrence, the pilot removed the skid gear before loading the helicopter onto the trailer to transport it to an aircraft maintenance organisation (AMO) facility based in Wonderboom Airport (FAWB). Upon reaching the AMO facility, the pilot was advised to report the occurrence to the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) before commencing with the repairs.



Figure 1: The helicopter after delivery to the AMO facility. (Source: AMO)



Figure 2: Damaged skid attachment.



Figure 3: Broken left skid gear.

		2	S-R			
Sample R44 II	(Robinso	on R44 II)				
Item	Entered Load	Weight Ib	Long Arm	Long Moment in-Ibs	Lat Ann	Lat Moment in-lbs
Basic Empty Weight Pilot P1 Fwd Left Pax Right Aft Pax Left Aft Pax Left Aft Pax Left Aft Pax Left Aft Pax Right Front Door Left Front Door Right Rear Door Left Pod Right Pod Zero Fuel	85.0 kg 43.0 kg 65.0 kg 74.0 kg 965 965 965 965 965 965 965 965 965 965	1510.0 187.4 94.8 143.3 163.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0	106.50 49.50 79.50 79.50 40.29 49.40 49.40 75.40 75.40 100.00 94.89 to Past-02 00"	160815 9276 4693 11392 12970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.50 12.20 -10.40 12.20 -12.20 -16.22 24.00 -24.00 -23.00 -33.00 33.00 0.86	755 2286 -986 1748 -1990 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0
Zero Fuel Main Fuel Tank Aux Fuel Tank All Up	25.0 usa 15.0 usa Weight and O	2098.6 150.2 90.1 2339.0 3 GK (Long firm)	94.89 106.00 102.00 95.88 5 Fwd:02.15	199146 15923 9193 224262	0.86 -13.50 13.00 0.41	1813 -2028 1172 957
Aircraft config MaxTOW Loaded Fuel Weight Total Pax Weight Total Cargo/Bag Weight	25 24 58	lockad 00.0 lb 0.3 8.6				

Figure 4: Weight and balance on the day of the accident. (Source: Pilot)



According to the South African Weather Service, the official weather at 1200Z issued for Krugersdorp Station 68368 (the closest station to the accident site) was as follows:

Visibility: 45km Cloud: No clouds Current temperature: 18.0°C Dew point temperature: -1.2°C Wind direction and speed: 250°13KT Pressure reduced to mean sea level: Q1029hPa



Chart 2: In ground effect (IGE) hover vs. gross weight.

According to the in-ground effect vs. gross weight in Chart 2, using the weight of the helicopter of 2 339 pounds (lbs) as calculated by the pilot (Figure 4) and the temperature of 18°C at the time of the accident, the helicopter could hover at a pressure altitude of approximately 6000 feet.

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Chart 3: Density altitude chart.

Determination of density altitude:

Pressure was determined to be approximately 6 000 lbs. Using the density altitude chart in Chart 3, with the pressure altitude of 6 000 lbs and the temperature of 18°C, density altitude was determined to be approximately 7 600 ft.

LIMIT MANIFOLD PRESSURE - IN. HG									
MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS POWER									
PRESS	OAT-°C								
ALT-FT	-30	-20	-10	0	10	20	30	40	
SL	22.6	22.9	23.2	23.5	23.8	24.1	24.4	24.7	
2000	22.2	22.5	22.8	23.1	23.4	23.7	24.0	24.2	
4000	21.8	22.2	22.5	22.8	23.1	23.4	23.7	23.9	
6000	6000 21.4 21.8 22.1 FULL THROTTLE								
FOR MAX TAKEOFF POWER (5 MIN), ADD 1.6 IN.									

Figure 5: Limit manifold pressure.

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According to the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), the maximum allowable take-off weight is 2 400 lbs, and the weight and balance provided by the pilot was 2 339 lbs, which was within limits.

With the outside air temperature of 18°C and the elevation of 5 735 feet (Chart 2), the pressure altitude was determined to be 6 000 ft.

The limit manifold pressure chart indicated that at 18°C and at a pressure altitude of 6 000 ft, the maximum available manifold pressure was full throttle in inches of mercury (In Hg). For maximum take-off power (Figure 5), one needs to add 1.6 In Hg to the calculated full throttle.

The pilot stated that the pressure manifold during transition phase was 24 In Hg, meaning that the power required for transitioning exceeded the power available. Therefore, the helicopter did not have enough power to lift-off, which caused the helicopter to crash. For maximum take-off power, the helicopter required approximately 22 In Hg or below to enable the pilot to at least add 1.6 In Hg to the full throttle to reach the 24 In Hg for lift-off. Therefore, the helicopter had reached the limit whilst still hovering and did not have enough power for take-off.

Findings

1. The pilot was initially issued a Private Pilot Licence (PPL) Helicopter on 21 June 2021 with an expiry date of 31 May 2022. The pilot applied for the licence renewal on 23 May 2022, however, there was a note which stated that the licence should not be reissued and that a query in this regards should be forwarded by the pilot to the Legal and Compliance Division of SACAA. The licence was not renewed; therefore, the pilot had an invalid PPL which had expired 13 months prior to the accident.

The Civil Aviation Regulations, 2011, Part 61 Pilot Licensing, SUBPART 1 states:) Note: **61.01.2 (1)** No person may act as a pilot of a South African registered aircraft, except in the case of dual instruction with an appropriately rated flight instructor, unless such person holds a valid pilot licence with applicable ratings issued, reissued, validated or revalidated by the Director or by an appropriate authority in terms of this Part or Part 62: Provided that a SPL may have been issued without a class rating or type rating

The pilot had flown a total of 71.6 hours with an invalid licence, which meant that he had contravened the provisions of the South African Civil Aviation Regulations Part 61.01.2 (1).

- 2. The pilot had a Class 2 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 23 August 2022 with an expiry date of 31 August 2023, and had no restrictions. The pilot was medically fit to conduct the flight; however, his licence had expired on 31 May 2022.
- 3. The last Mandatory Periodic Inspection (MPI) on the helicopter was completed on 17 April 2023 at 1 092.1 Hobbs hours. The helicopter was issued a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) on 17 April 2023 with an expiry date of 16 April 2024 or at 1 192.1 Hobbs hours, whichever occurs first. The helicopter was flown a further 7.5 hours since the last MPI.
- 4. The helicopter had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) which was initially issued on 20 October 2000. The C of A was last renewed on 11 August 2022 with an expiry date of 31 October 2023. The helicopter's Certificate of Registration (C of R) was issued to the current owner on 23 June 2021.

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- 5. The AMO responsible for the maintenance of the helicopter had a valid certificate of approval which was issued on 3 November 2022 with an expiry date of 30 November 2023.
- 6. According to Chart 2, for maximum take-off power, the helicopter was supposed to be at approximately 22 In Hg or below to allow for an additional 1.6 In Hg for the full throttle to reach the limit for lift-off. The helicopter reached the limit whilst still hovering and did not have enough power for take-off. The pilot stated that the pressure manifold during the transitioning phase was 24 In Hg, meaning that the power required for transitioning exceeded the power available; therefore, the helicopter did not have enough power for lift-off, hence the subsequent crash.

Probable Cause(s)

The helicopter experienced low RPM during transition due to operation in high pressure altitude.

Contributing Factor(s)

Inadequate or improper flight planning.

Failure to consider the effects of high-density altitude.

Safety Action(s)

None.

Safety Message

Pilots who operate in areas of high altitude must always ensure that the effects of high-density altitudes are considered before commencing with a flight.

About this Report

The decision to conduct a limited investigation is based on factors including whether the cause is known and the evidence supporting the cause is clear, the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation and that will determine the scope of an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited investigation has been conducted, and the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) has relied on the information submitted by the affected person/s and organisation/s to compile this limited report. The report has been compiled using information supplied in the initial notification, as well as from follow-up desk top enquiries to bring awareness of potential safety issues to the industry in respect of this occurrence, as well as possible safety action/s that the industry might want to consider in preventing a recurrence of a similar occurrence.

All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.

Purpose

In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011 and ICAO Annex 13, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.

Disclaimer

This report is produced without prejudice to the rights of the AIID, which are reserved.

This report is issued by: Accident and Incident Investigations Division South African Civil Aviation Authority Republic of South Africa

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