Section/division **Accident and Incident Investigations Division** Form Number: CA 12-57

LIMITED OCCURRENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT – FINAL

Reference Number	CA18/3/2/1563						
Classification	Serious Incident		**Date**	23 July 2026		**Time**	1125Z
Type of Operation	Private (Part 91)						
Location							
Place of Departure	Brakpan Aerodrome (FABB), Gauteng Province		Place of Intended Landing	Morningside Farm Aerodrome (FAMS), North West Province			
Place of Occurrence	Runway 03 at Morningside Farm Aerodrome (FAMS), North West Province						
GPS Co-ordinates	Latitude	25°41'52.39"S	Longitude	026°54'39.36"E		Elevation	4 197 feet
Aircraft Information							
Registration	ZS-PDA						
Make; Model; S/N	Cirrus SR22 (Serial Number: 2319)						
Damage to Aircraft	Minor		Total Aircraft Hours	1 246.3			
Pilot-in-command							
Licence Type	Private Pilot Licence (PPL)		Gender	Male		Age	48
Licence Valid	Yes	Total Hours	242	Total Hours on Type			72.8
Total Hours 30 Days	9		Total Flying on Type Past 90 Days				21.4
People On-board	1+0	**Injuries**	0	**Fatalities**	0	**Other (on ground)**	0

What Happened

On Thursday, 23 July 2026, a pilot on-board a Cirrus SR22 aircraft with registration ZS-PDA took off from Brakpan Aerodrome (FABB) in Gauteng province to Morningside Farm Aerodrome (FAMS) in North West province. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the flight which was conducted under the provisions of Part 91 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, as amended.

According to the pilot, the aircraft had approximately 80 gallons of fuel in the tank. No anomalies were identified during the pre-flight inspection of the aircraft. The aircraft departed from FABB at approximately 1030Z. Upon arrival at FAMS, the pilot joined overhead the aerodrome following the unmanned joining procedure. He assessed the wind condition as calm with occasional gusts and, therefore, elected to land on Runway 03 with the aircraft's speed at 80 knots (kts) and flaps set at second notch. During the flare, the aircraft touched down on the runway with excessive energy (high rate of descent) and, as a result, it bounced. After the second touchdown, the pilot maintained directional control of the aircraft and taxied to the hangar.

After parking the aircraft, the pilot found minor damage to the propeller which was caused when it struck the runway. The pilot was not injured.

Figure 1: Approximate location of the serious incident site. (Source: Google Earth Map)

Figures 2 and 3: The damaged propeller. (Source: Operator)

Aircraft Landing Procedure (Source: Cirrus 22 Pilot's Operating Handbook [POH])

Before-landing Approach

Seat belt and shoulder harness: secured

Mixture: full rich

Fuel pump: boost
Flaps: as required
Landing light: as required
Autopilot: disengage

Landing

Caution: Landing should be made with full flaps. Landings with less than full flaps are recommended only if the flaps fail to deploy or to extend the aircraft's glide distance due to engine malfunction. Landings with flaps at 50% or 0%, power should be used to achieve a normal glidepath and low descent rate. Flare should be minimised.

Normal Landing

Normal landing approach should be made at 80 kts and full flaps. The aircraft landing should be conducted with a speed of between 75 and 80 kts (77 kts) and full flap settings. Surface winds and air turbulence are usually the primary factors in determining the most comfortable approach speed. Actual touchdown should be made with power off and with the main wheels first to reduce the landing speed and subsequent need for braking. Gently lower the nose to the runway after airplane speed has diminished. This is especially important for rough or soft field landing.

The pilot stated that on final approach, the aircraft's speed was 80 kts with the flaps at second notch.

Flare (Round-out)

During the landing phase, the flare, or round-out, is the point at which the pilot smoothly transitions the aircraft from the final approach attitude to the landing attitude. It is normally initiated at about 10 to 20 feet above the runway and should be progressive and controlled. As the aircraft enters ground effect and the runway closure rate reduces, gentle back-elevator pressure is applied to raise the nose slightly, arrest the descent, and allow the aircraft to settle onto the main wheels as airspeed bleeds off.

The flare is a critical part of the landing because it controls the aircraft's remaining energy close to the ground. If the aircraft is allowed to touch down while still carrying excessive speed or sink rate, or if the flare is mistimed, the landing loads may increase and the aircraft may bounce. A bounced landing can reduce the pilot's ability to maintain the correct landing attitude and may result in secondary runway contact, including propeller contact with the surface. A well-timed flare, flown in the correct configuration and at the appropriate approach speed, supports a stable touchdown on the main wheels and reduces the risk of damage during landing.

Crew

The pilot had a Private Pilot Licence (PPL) that was initially issued by the Regulator on 19 January 2011. The licence was reissued on 10 September 2023 with an expiry date of 31 August 2026. The pilot's Class 2 aviation medical certificate was valid; it was issued on 26 November 2024 with an expiry date of 30 November 2026 and with no restrictions. The aircraft type was endorsed in the pilot's licence. He had a total of 242 hours of which 72.8 hours were on the aircraft type.

Aircraft

The last mandatory periodic inspection (MPI) of the aircraft was certified on 18 March 2026 at 1 203.9 airframe hours. The aircraft had a total of 1 246.3 hours at the time of the serious incident; it had accrued 42.4 hours since the stated MPI. A Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) was issued on 19 March 2026 by an aircraft maintenance organisation (AMO) with an expiry date of 18 March 2027 or at 1 303.9 airframe hours, whichever comes first. The aircraft had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) that was issued on 6 November 2025 with an expiry date of 30 November 2026. A Certificate of Registration (C of R) was issued to the present owner on 17 April 2025.

The AMO which conducted the MPI was issued an AMO Certificate on 26 September 2025 with an expiry date of 30 September 2026.

Reporting Procedure

The serious incident was reported to the relevant authorities seven days after its occurrence when a Special Flight Permit (SFP) process was initiated with the Regulator in preparation to start with the repair works; the AMO was the only party that was notified of the serious incident.

Civil Aviation Regulations Part 12 states:

Notification of Incidents

12.02.2 (1) A PIC, a flight crew member, an operator or an owner, as the case may be, of an aircraft involved in an incident within the Republic, shall, as soon as possible but at least within 24 hours since the time of such incident, report such incident to:-
(a) the Executive responsible for Aircraft Accident and Incident investigation;
(b) an ATSU; or (c) the nearest Police Station.

Findings

1. The pilot was qualified and properly licensed to undertake the flight.

2. The aircraft maintenance organisation (AMO) which maintained the aircraft had a valid AMO Certificate that was issued by the Regulator.

3. The aircraft records revealed that the aircraft was maintained in compliance with the manufacturer's prescripts.

4. The aircraft landed at 80 knots (kts) which was within the recommended landing speed range; however, the flaps were configured to second notch instead of full.

5. During the flare, the aircraft touched down with residual energy and bounced, indicating that the flare may not have fully arrested the sink rate before touchdown, this contributed to the propeller strike on the runway.

6. The serious incident was reported seven days after its occurrence during a request process for a Special Flight Permit (SFP) to conduct repair works. The AMO was the only party notified. The delayed reporting was not in compliance with the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) Part 12.02.2, which requires prompt reporting of occurrences.

7. The pilot was not injured, and the aircraft sustained minor damage.

Probable Cause(s)

The aircraft landed hard and at an excessive energy which led to a bounce and propeller strike on the runway.

Contributing Factor(s)

Incorrect landing configuration (technique).

Safety Action(s)

None.

Safety Message

The occurrence was reported to the relevant authority seven days after its occurrence, which was not in compliance with CAR Part 12.02.2. The authority only became aware of the occurrence when a Special Flight Permit was requested, through the AMO, for maintenance repairs. A similar delayed reporting occurrence had been reported less than two months earlier. Delayed reporting reduces the opportunity for a timely investigation. This is of particular concern in general aviation, where operations in remote, non-controlled airspace receive limited regulatory oversight and require operators to manage safety proactively. Timely occurrence reporting is essential to ensure that safety concerns are identified early and addressed without delay.

About this Report
The decision to conduct a limited investigation is based on factors including whether the cause is known and the evidence supporting the cause is clear, the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation and that will determine the scope of an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited investigation has been conducted, and the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) has relied on the information submitted by the affected person/s and organisation/s to compile this limited report. The report has been compiled using information supplied in the initial notification, as well as from follow-up desktop enquiries to bring awareness of potential safety issues to the industry in respect of this occurrence, as well as possible safety action/s that the industry might want to consider in preventing a recurrence of a similar occurrence. *All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.*
Purpose
In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011 and ICAO Annex 13, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.
Disclaimer
This report is produced without prejudice to the rights of the AIID, which are reserved.

This report is issued by:

Accident and Incident Investigations Division
South African Civil Aviation Authority
Republic of South Africa