

PRELIMINARY ACCIDENT REPORT

Accident and Incident Investigations Division

Accident
- Preliminary Report -
AIID Ref No: CA18/2/3/10621



Figure 1: A file picture of the ZU-FWF aircraft. (Source: jetphotos.com)

Description:

On Sunday, 30 November 2025, two pilots on-board a Sling 2 light sport aircraft (LSA) with registration ZU-FWF were engaged in a private (acceptance) flight from Morningstar Airfield near Philadelphia, Western Cape province, with the intention to land at the same airfield. The owner of the aircraft stated that there was a sale agreement of the aircraft between himself and a prospective buyer from Chief Dawid Stuurman International Airport (FAPE) in Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape province. Both pilots conducted a detailed pre-flight inspection of the aircraft and no anomalies were cited. The aircraft had a total of 60 litres (L) of Motor Gasoline (Mogas) in the tanks. The pilot who represented the owner occupied the left seat and was the pilot flying (PF), and the pilot who represented the buyer occupied the right seat and was the pilot monitoring (PM). The PF stated that he started the engine and taxied the aircraft to the threshold of Runway 20. After completion of the pre-take-off checks, the PF opened the throttle to full power and commenced with the take-off run.

The owner, who was in the clubhouse, watched the aircraft as it took off; he reported that the windsock indicated a strong headwind. The aircraft rotated and executed a rapid steep climb. After flying over the threshold of the opposite runway (Runway 02) at approximately 250 feet (ft) above ground level (AGL), the pilot commenced a left turn. The aircraft descended in a nose-down attitude and crashed on a bush-type terrain approximately 150 metres (m) south-east of Morningstar Airfield. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces; both pilots were fatally injured.

Occurrence Details

Reference Number : CA18/2/3/10621
Occurrence Category : Accident (Category 1)
Type of Operation : Private (Part 94)
Name of Operator : Coenrad Ernest Birkenstock
Aircraft Registration : ZU-FWF
Aircraft Make and Model : The Airplane Factory (Pty) Ltd; Sling 2 LSA
Nationality : South African
Place : Bush-type terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road
Date and Time : 30 November 2025 at 0905Z
Injuries : Two fatalities
Damage : Destroyed

Purpose of the Investigation

In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.

All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.

Investigation Process

The Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) was notified of the occurrence involving a Sling 2 LSA aircraft which occurred on a bush-type terrain, south of Morningstar Airfield, on 30 November 2025 at 0905Z. The occurrence was classified as an accident according to the CAR 2011 Part 12 and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) STD Annex 13 definitions.

The AIID has appointed an investigation team to conduct an on-site investigation. Notifications were sent to the States of Registry, Operator, and Design and Manufacturer in accordance with the CAR 2011 Part 12 and the ICAO Annex 13 Chapter 4. The States did not appoint an accredited representative and/or advisor. The AIID will lead the investigation and issue the final report of this accident in accordance with the CAR 2011 Part 12 and the ICAO Annex 13.

The information contained in this preliminary report is derived from the information gathered during the on-going investigation into the occurrence. Later, an interim or final report may contain altered information in case new evidence is found during the on-going investigation that requires changes to the information depicted in this report.

The AIID reports are made available to the public at:

<https://www.caa.co.za/industry-information/accidents-and-incidents/>

Notes:

- Whenever the following words are mentioned in this report, they shall mean the following:*
Accident — this investigated accident
Aircraft — the Sling 2 LSA aircraft involved in this accident
Investigation — the investigation into the circumstances of this accident
Pilot — the pilot involved in this accident
Report — this accident report

- 2. Photos and figures used in this report were taken from different sources and may have been adjusted from the original for the sole purpose of improving clarity of the report. Modifications to images used in this report were limited to cropping, magnification, file compression; or enhancement of colour, brightness, contrast; or addition of text boxes, arrows, or lines.*

Disclaimer

This report is produced without prejudice to the rights of the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), which are reserved.

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| Abbreviation | Description |
|---------------------|--|
| ° | Degrees |
| °C | Degrees Celsius |
| A/C | Aircraft |
| ACCID | Accident |
| AGL | Above Ground Level |
| AIID | Accident and Incident Investigations Division |
| AMO | Aircraft Maintenance Organisation |
| AME | Aircraft Maintenance Engineer |
| AP | Approved Person |
| CAA | Civil Aviation Authority |
| CAR | Civil Aviation Regulations |
| CCTV | Close Circuit Television |
| CVR | Cockpit Voice Recorder |
| CB | Circuit Breaker |
| C of A | Certificate of Airworthiness |
| C of R | Certificate of Registration |
| CRS | Certificate of Release to Service |
| EFIS | Electronic Flight Instrument System |
| EMS | Emergency Medical Services |
| FAPE | Chief David Stuurman International Airport |
| FACT | Cape Town International Airport |
| FDR | Flight Data Recorder |
| Ft | Feet |
| GPS | Global Positioning System |
| hPa | Hectopascal |
| IIC | Investigator-in-Charge |
| IAW | In Accordance With |
| Kt | Knots |
| LSA | Light Sport Aircraft |
| LCD | Liquid Crystal Display |
| L | Litres |
| M | Metres |
| METAR | Meteorological Aerodrome Report |
| MHz | Megahertz |
| NM | Nautical Mile |
| NPL | National Pilot Licence |
| POH | Pilot's Operating Handbook |
| PPL | Private Pilot Licence |
| PF | Pilot Flying |
| PM | Pilot Monitoring |
| SACAA | South African Civil Aviation Authority |
| SAWS | South African Weather Service |
| SD | Secure Digital Card |
| SAPS | South African Police Services |
| TBO | Time Between Overhaul |
| UTC | Co-ordinated Universal Time |
| VMC | Visual Meteorological Conditions |
| QNH | Altitude Above Mean Sea Level |
| Z | Zulu (Term for Universal Co-ordinated Time - Zero Hours Greenwich) |

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1. History of Flight

- 1.1.1. On Sunday, 30 November 2025, two pilots on-board a Sling 2 light sport aircraft (LSA) with registration ZU-FWF were engaged in a private (acceptance) flight from Morningstar Airfield near Philadelphia, Western Cape province, with the intention to land at the same airfield. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Part 94 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, as amended.
- 1.1.2. According to the owner, there was a sale agreement between himself and a prospective buyer from Chief Dawid Stuurman International Airport (FAPE) in Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape province. The purchasing of the aircraft was facilitated by a salesperson from Johannesburg (JHB), Gauteng province. On Sunday morning, the pilot who represented the owner brought Motor Gasoline (Mogas) in jerricans from an unknown source, which was uploaded to the tanks; the aircraft fuel gauge indicated a total of 86 litres (L) after the upload. The pilot (representing the owner) conducted a pre-flight inspection of the aircraft and nothing abnormal was found. The aircraft's technical documentation had no outstanding defects or deferred items. Later, the pilot started the engine and taxied the aircraft to the threshold of Runway 20, whereafter he took off. He conducted three touch-and-go landings followed by a full-stop landing on the same runway. He then parked the aircraft next to the clubhouse. The same morning, the buyer brought with him a pilot, and they were joined by the salesperson; the intention was to ferry the aircraft to FAPE after the acceptance flight was conducted and signed off.
- 1.1.3. The aircraft was towed to the hangar where a detailed inspection was conducted by both pilots in the presence of the prospective buyer and the salesperson. According to the salesperson, nothing of concern was raised with the aircraft and technical documentation. The salesperson stated that the aircraft fuel gauge indicated a total of 60L in the tanks. The last page of the aircraft flight folio with serial number 257217 had no evidence of fuel replenishment on 30 November 2025. (The flight that was conducted on the morning of 30 November 2025 was not recorded, which was in contravention of Part 91.03.5 [1] and Part 91.03.6 [1] of the South African Civil aviation [SACAA] regulations.) The two pilots later boarded the aircraft after they were satisfied with its condition. The pilot representing the owner occupied the left seat and was the pilot flying (PF). The pilot representing the buyer occupied the right seat and was the pilot monitoring (PM). The PF started the engine and allowed it to run for a while until all the parameters were within the normal operating limits. The owner, the prospective buyer and the salesperson made their way to the clubhouse's cafeteria to witness the aircraft's take-off. Later, the PF taxied the aircraft to the threshold of Runway 20.

- 1.1.4. After a few seconds, the PF opened the throttle to full power and commenced with the take-off run. According to the owner, the windsock alongside the runway indicated a strong headwind. After rotation, the aircraft executed a rapid steep climb; it flew over the threshold of the opposite runway (Runway 02). At approximately 250 feet (ft) above ground level (AGL), the aircraft executed a left turn. A few seconds later, the PF was heard broadcasting on ground frequency 126.8-Megahertz (MHz), informing pilots on another aircraft which was in the holding point of Runway 20 to remain where they were as he was turning back (with a possible engine defect). The aircraft descended in a nose-down attitude and crashed on a bush-type terrain, approximately 150 metres (m) south-east of Morningstar Airfield. The South African Police Service (SAPS), the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and the firefighting department from the City of Cape Town Metropolitan were notified about the accident and responded promptly. It was established that the pilots succumbed to their injuries during the accident; the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces.
- 1.1.5. The accident occurred on a bush-type terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road at Global Positioning System (GPS) co-ordinates determined to be 33°45'52" South 18°33'0" East, at an elevation of 157ft.



Figure 2: An aerial view of the approximate accident site south-east of Morningstar Airfield (yellow pin) near Van Schoorsdrift Road. (Source: Google Earth)

1.2. Injuries to Persons

| Injuries | Pilot | Crew | Pass | Total On-board | Other |
|--------------|----------|----------|----------|----------------|----------|
| Fatal | 2 | - | - | 2 | - |
| Serious | - | - | - | - | - |
| Minor | - | - | - | - | - |
| None | - | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 2 | - | - | 2 | - |

Note: Other means people on the ground.

1.2.1. The pilots sustained fatal injuries.

1.3. Damage to Aircraft

1.3.1. The aircraft was destroyed during the accident sequence.



Figure 3: The aircraft at the accident site.

1.4. Other Damage

1.4.1. None.

1.5. Personnel Information

Pilot Flying (PF)

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------|------|-----|----|
| Nationality | South African | Gender | Male | Age | 67 |
| Licence Type | National Pilot Licence (NPL) | | | | |
| Licence Valid | Yes | Type Endorsed | Yes | | |
| Ratings | National Test Flight Rating - LSA | | | | |
| Medical Expiry Date | 26 September 2026 | | | | |

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| Restrictions | Wear suitable corrective lenses for defective distant, intermediate and near vision |
| Previous Accidents | None |

Note: Previous accidents refer to past accidents the pilot was involved in, when relevant to this accident.

Flying Experience:

| | |
|----------------------------|---------|
| Total Hours | 1 863.2 |
| Total Past 24 Hours | Unknown |
| Total Past 7 Days | Unknown |
| Total Past 90 Days | Unknown |
| Total on Type Past 90 Days | Unknown |
| Total on Type | Unknown |

1.5.1. The PF had a National Pilot Licence (NPL) that was initially issued on 10 December 2015 in accordance with (IAW) Part 61 of the CAR 2011. The licence was revalidated on 17 July 2025 with an expiry date of 14 July 2027. The PF had the aircraft type (Sling 2 LSA) endorsed on his licence.

1.5.2. The PF had a Class 4 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 6 September 2024 with an expiry date of 26 September 2026. The PF had a restriction to wear suitable corrective lenses for defective distant, intermediate and near vision.

Pilot Monitoring (PM)

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|------|-----|----|
| Nationality | South African | Gender | Male | Age | 21 |
| Licence Type | Private Pilot Licence (PPL) | | | | |
| Licence Valid | Yes | Type Endorsed | Yes | | |
| Ratings | Night rating | | | | |
| Medical Expiry Date | 28 February 2030 | | | | |
| Restrictions | None | | | | |
| Previous Accidents | None | | | | |

Note: Previous accidents refer to past accidents the pilot was involved in, when relevant to this accident.

Flying Experience:


| | |
|----------------------------|-------|
| Total Hours | 203.4 |
| Total Past 24 Hours | 0 |
| Total Past 7 Days | 0 |
| Total Past 90 Days | 35 |
| Total on Type Past 90 Days | 10.8 |
| Total on Type | 10.8 |

1.5.3 The PM had a Private Pilot Licence (PPL) that was initially issued on 24 July 2023 in accordance with (IAW) Part 61 of the CAR 2011. The licence was revalidated on 24 July 2023 with an expiry date of 31 July 2026. The PM had the aircraft type (Sling 2 LSA) endorsed on his licence.

1.5.4 The PM had a Class 2 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 25 February 2025 with an expiry date of 28 February 2030. The PM had no medical restrictions.

1.6. **Aircraft Description** (Source: Pilot Operating Handbook [POH])

1.6.1. *The Sling 2 LSA is a two-seat (side-by-side), single-engine aircraft of semi monocoque construction. The aircraft is powered by a four-stroke, four cylinders horizontally opposed spark ignition Rotax 912 ULS engine with one central camshaft pushrod. The engine features liquid cooled cylinder heads with ram air cooled cylinders. It comprised of a dry sump forced lubrication and had a dual contactless capacitor discharge magneto type ignition system. The engine also comprised a mechanical fuel pump and a backup electrical fuel pump. It is fitted with the MGL Avionics Stratomaster Voyager electronic flight instrument system (EFIS) which provided full primary flight display attitude and directional guidance along electronic engine parameters information on a multi-colour liquid crystal display (LCD) screen.*






Diagram 1: The Sling 2 LSA aircraft's three primary dimensions. (Source: POH)



Figure 4: The ZU-FWF cockpit showing the Stratomaster Voyager MGL Avionics EFIS.

Airframe:

| | | |
|---|--|-------------------|
| Manufacturer/Model | The Airplane Factory Pty (Ltd) / Sling 2 LSA | |
| Serial Number | 020 | |
| Year of Manufacture | 2013 | |
| Total Airframe Hours (At Time of Accident) | 639.5 | |
| Last Annual Inspection (Date & Hours) | 21 October 2025 | 639.0 |
| Hours Since Last Inspection | 0.50 | |
| CRS Issue Date | 21 October 2025 | |
| Authority-to-Fly (Issue Date & Expiry Date) | 24 November 2025 | 30 September 2026 |
| C of R (Issue Date) (Present Owner) | 28 June 2022 | |
| Type of Fuel Used | Mogas | |
| Operating Category | Private (Part 94) | |
| Previous Accidents | None | |

Note: Previous accidents refer to past accidents the aircraft was involved in, when relevant to this accident.

Engine:

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Manufacturer/Model | Bombardier-Rotax GMBH / 912 ULS |
| Serial Number | 4428168 |
| Part Number | Unknown |
| Hours Since New | 762.4 |
| Hours Since Overhaul | Time Between Overhaul (TBO) is 1 500 hours / TBO not reached |

Propeller:

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Manufacturer/Model | Warp drive / Unknown |
| Serial Number | T11259 |
| Part Number | Unknown |
| Hours Since New | 543.8 |
| Hours Since Overhaul | The Warp drive propeller does not have the specified/mandatory TBO interval/; they operate on a condition-based maintenance philosophy |

1.6.2. The aircraft had a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) that was issued on 29 September 2025 with an expiry date of 28 September 2026 or at 5 390.4 hours, whichever occurs first.

1.7. Meteorological Information

1.7.1. The weather information below was obtained from the Cape Town International Airport (FACT) weather station on 30 November 2025 at 1030Z. The approximate accident site was 14.5 nautical miles (nm) from FACT.

| | | | | | |
|----------------|------|-------------|----------|------------|------|
| Wind Direction | 180° | Wind Speed | 11kt | Visibility | 10km |
| Temperature | 25°C | Cloud Cover | Nil | Cloud Base | Nil |
| Dew Point | 11°C | QNH | 1014 hPa | | |

1.8. Aids to Navigation

1.8.1. The aircraft was equipped with standard navigational equipment as approved by the Regulator (SACAA). There were no records indicating that the navigational equipment was unserviceable prior to the flight.

1.9. Communication

1.9.1. The aircraft was equipped with a standard communication system as approved by the Regulator. There were no recorded defects with the communication system prior to the flight.

1.10. Aerodrome Information

1.10.1. The accident occurred on a bush-type terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road, approximately 150m south-east of Morningstar Airfield.

| | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Aerodrome Name | Morningstar Airfield |
| Aerodrome Location | Western Cape Province |
| Aerodrome Co-ordinates | S33°45'.32" E018°32'.54" |
| Aerodrome Elevation | 200 feet AMSL |
| Runway Dimensions | 645 metres (m) x 12m |
| Runway Designations | 02/20 |
| Runway Used | 20 |
| Runway Surface | Asphalt |
| Aerodrome Status | Licensed |
| Approach Facilities | None |

1.11. Flight Recorders

1.11.1. The aircraft was neither equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), nor was it required by regulation to be fitted to the aircraft type.

1.11.2. The aircraft was equipped with an old model MGL Avionics Stratomaster Voyager EFIS unit. The unit sustained impact damage during the accident sequence. The Secure Digital (SD) card was ejected during the accident; however, it was found intact. The SD card that was recovered from the aircraft contained no data of the last two flights. The unit did not have internal data recording capabilities; it could only record with the external SD card that was set up and used by the pilot.



Figures 5 and 6: The EFIS unit (back and front) after it was removed from the cockpit.

1.12. Wreckage and Impact Information

1.12.1. A video footage downloaded from the close-circuit television (CCTV) camera that was mounted on the roof of the clubhouse at Morningstar Airfield showed the aircraft as it climbed in a southerly direction after take-off from Runway 20. The footage showed the windsock indicating a strong headwind.

1.12.2. At approximately 250 AGL, the aircraft was observed executing a left turn followed by a nose-down attitude whilst in descent; it then disappeared from the CCTV camera coverage. The aircraft crashed on a bush-type terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road, approximately 150m south-east of Morningstar Airfield.



Figure 7: The video footage snapshot showing the aircraft in a climb (yellow circle), and the windsock indicating a strong headwind (yellow arrow).



Figure 8: The video footage snapshot showing the aircraft executing a left turn (yellow circle).




Figure 9: The video footage snapshot showing the aircraft in a nose-down attitude.

1.12.3. The aircraft was examined by the investigating team at the accident site; none of the components or flight controls was missing and no evidence of defective flight controls was observed. The aircraft's tail section (empennage) showed compression marks due to rapid deceleration. None of the tall tree branches was hit or severed before impact; the estimated aircraft trajectory was 82° magnetic.

1.12.4. Evidence indicated that the aircraft was in a nose-down attitude on impact and the flaps were retracted (up position). The right-wing root leading edge impacted the stem of a large tree which caused the wing tanks to rupture. The aircraft had an estimated 57L Mogas remaining in the tanks at the time of impact. There was a strong smell of fuel at the accident scene. The nose gear strut was found broken due to overload, and the spring-loaded main landing gear struts were stretched backward. The main wheel assemblies (tyres) remained intact and inflated. The propeller had struck the soft ground and one of the blades broke off. Examination of the remaining two composite blades indicated that the engine was not delivering power at the time of impact.



Figures 10 and 11: The aircraft's right-wing root against the tree stem. The yellow arrow indicates the direction of travel.



Figures 12 and 13: The left wing with the flaps in a retracted (up) position and the left main gear strut strained backward (yellow arrows on the left picture). The engine nose section is buried under the soft ground and the remaining two blades are still intact (yellow arrows on the right picture).

1.12.5. The engine was pushed back towards the firewall; the engine mounts and the firewall were severely damaged. External examination of the engine revealed a clean air filter; the exhaust system was damaged but no anomalies were noted; the cooling system was intact. The oil reservoir cap was missing, however, there was oil spillage/sputter on the inside engine cowling (compartment), suggesting that it was not in place during impact. Examination of the cockpit area revealed that both control columns had broken off. The throttle lever was in a full forward position (maximum power), and the fuel selector in the middle console was selected to the right tank. The EFIS screen was crushed, however, the SD card had ejected. The circuit breakers (CBs) on the instrument panel were firmly secured to the mounting panel and were pressed in; all the switches including those of the fuel pumps were on.




Figure 14: An enlarged view of the EFIS (yellow arrow) unit in the cockpit with the switches in 'on' position.

1.13. Medical and Pathological Information

1.13.1. To be discussed in the final report.

1.14. Fire

1.14.1. There was no evidence of a pre- or post-impact fire.

1.15. Survival Aspects

1.15.1 The accident was not survivable due to high impact forces that compromised the structural integrity of the cockpit; this resulted in fatal injuries of the two pilots.

1.15.2 The aircraft was neither equipped with an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) nor was it required by regulation to be fitted to this aircraft.

1.16. Tests and Research

1.16.1. To be discussed in the final report.

1.17. Organisational and Management Information

1.17.1. The aircraft was operated under the provisions of Part 94 of the CAR 2011, as amended.

1.17.2. The aircraft was maintained by an approved person (AP) with an AP Certificate that was issued by the Regulator on 4 December 2023 and expiring on 3 December 2025.

1.18. **Additional Information**

1.18.1. Flight Folio (Source: SACAA Regulations)

91.03.5 (1) *The owner or operator of a South African registered aircraft shall ensure that the aircraft carries a flight folio or any other similar document which meets the requirements of and contains the information as prescribed in Document SA-CATS 91, at all times.*

(2) *The flight folio shall be kept up-to-date and maintained in a legible manner by the PIC.*

(3) *All entries shall be made immediately upon completion of the occurrence to which they refer.*

(4) *In the case of maintenance being undertaken on the aircraft, the entry shall be certified by the person taking responsibility for the maintenance performed.*

(5) *The owner or operator shall retain the flight folio for a period of five years calculated from the date of the last entry therein.*

1.18.2. Fuel Record

91.03.6 (1) *The owner of operator of an aircraft shall maintain fuel records for each flight undertaken by the aircraft under the control of such owner or operator.*

(2) *The PIC of the aircraft shall enter the fuel and oil records referred to in sub-regulation (1) in the flight folio.*

1.18.3. Engine Failure After Take-off (Source: POH)

3.3.2 Engine failure immediately after take-off

1. Speed / trim - best glide speed (72 KIAS).
2. Find a suitable place on the ground to land safely. The landing should be planned straight ahead with only small changes in direction not exceeding 45 degrees to either side.
3. Flaps - as needed (plan to land as slowly as possible).

Before touch down

4. Magnetos / ignition - off
5. Master - off
6. Fuel selector valve - off
7. Electric fuel pump - off (912 ULS)
- Electric fuel pumps (both) - off (914 UL / 912 iS)

| |
|--|
| <p style="text-align: center;">WARNING</p> <p>Flaps and elevator trim cannot operate without power on the main bus. Make final flap selection before turning master switch off.</p> |
|--|

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1.19. Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

1.19.1. None.

2. FINDINGS

2.1. General

From the available evidence, the following preliminary findings were made with respect to this accident. These shall not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any organisation or individual.

To serve the objective of this investigation, the following sections are included in the conclusions heading:

- **Findings** — are statements of all significant conditions, events, or circumstances in this accident. The findings are significant steps in this accident sequence, but they are not always causal or indicate deficiencies.

2.2. Findings

2.2.1 The pilot flying (PF) had a National Pilot Licence (NPL) that was initially issued on 10 December 2015 in accordance with (IAW) Part 61 of the CAR 2011. The licence was revalidated on 17 July 2025 with an expiry date of 14 July 2027. The pilot had the aircraft type (Sling 2 LSA) endorsed on his licence.

- 2.2.2 The PF had a Class 4 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 6 September 2024 with an expiry date of 26 September 2026. The PF had a restriction to wear suitable corrective lenses for defective distant, intermediate and near vision.
- 2.2.3 The pilot monitoring (PM) had a Private Pilot Licence (PPL) that was initially issued on 24 July 2023 in accordance with (IAW) Part 61 of the CAR 2011. The licence was revalidated on 24 July 2023 with an expiry date of 31 July 2026. The PM had the aircraft type (Sling 2 LSA) endorsed on his licence.
- 2.2.4 The PM had a Class 2 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 25 February 2025 with an expiry date of 28 February 2030. The PM had no medical restrictions.
- 2.2.5 The aircraft was issued a Certificate of Registration (C of R) on 28 June 2022 under the current owner.
- 2.2.6 The aircraft's Authority-to-Fly (ATF) Certificate was initially issued by the Regulator on 4 September 2019; the certificate was renewed on 24 November 2025 with an expiry date of 30 September 2026.
- 2.2.7 The last 100-hour annual inspection of the aircraft was conducted by the approved person (AP) on 21 October 2025 at 639.0 hours.
- 2.2.8 The Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) was issued on 21 October 2025 with an expiry date of 21 October 2026 or at 739.0 hours, whichever occurs first. The aircraft was flown for approximately 0.50 hours after the last inspection.
- 2.2.9. The AP who certified the last 100-hour inspection had an AP Certificate that was issued by the Regulator on 4 December 2023 with an expiry date of 3 December 2025.

3. ON-GOING INVESTIGATION

- 3.1. The AIID investigation is on-going and the investigator will investigate other aspects of this accident which may or may not have safety implications.

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. General

The safety recommendations listed in this report are proposed according to paragraph 6.8 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and are based on the

conclusions listed in heading 3 of this report. The AIID expects that all safety issues identified by the investigation are addressed by the receiving States and organisations.

4.2. Safety Recommendation/s

4.2.1. None.

5. APPENDICES

5.1. None.

This report is issued by:

**Accident and Incident Investigations Division
South African Civil Aviation Authority
Republic of South Africa**