

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

				Reference:	CA18/2/3/9799	
Aircraft Registration	ZS-MGB	Date of Accident	3 July 2019		Time of Accident	1145Z
Type of Aircraft	Cessna 210T	Type of Operation		Private (Part 91)		
Pilot-in-command Licence Type	Private Pilot Licence	Age	65		Licence Valid	Yes
Pilot-in-command Flying Experience	Total Flying Hours		1780.2		Hours on Type	1512.7
Last Point of Departure	Pongola Aerodrome (FAPL), KwaZulu-Natal Province					
Next Point of Intended Landing	Rand Aerodrome (FAGM), Gauteng Province					
Location of the accident site with reference to easily defined geographical points (GPS readings if possible)						
Taxiway at Pongola Aerodrome at the following GPS co-ordinates: S27° 21' 59.77" E031° 36' 36.12" at an elevation of 918.4ft						
Meteorological Information	Wind: light and variable; Temperature: 25°C; Visibility: 9999m; Clouds: Nil					
Number of People On-board	1+0	No. of People Injured	0		No. of People Killed	1 (on the ground)
Synopsis	<p>On 3 July 2019, a pilot arrived at Pongola Aerodrome (FAPL) with the intention of flying an aircraft with registration marks ZS-MGB from FAPL to the Rand Aerodrome (FAGM). The flight was to be conducted under Part 91, which is a private flight. The pilot pulled out the aircraft from the hangar, conducted the pre-flight checks, and then started the engines. He taxied the aircraft towards the beginning of the taxiway where he stopped to complete the take-off run-up checks. While he was busy with the run-up checks, a security guard approached the aircraft from the right side. However, once he realised that the pilot was seating on the left side of the aircraft, he changed direction, walking towards the front of the aircraft to access the left side of it. As he did so, he unknowingly walked into a spinning propeller. The security guard succumbed to his injuries before the emergency medical services arrived at the scene. The aircraft sustained no damage.</p> <p>FAPL is a licensed aerodrome. The investigation uncovered that the aerodrome did not conform to the requirements of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011 as amended.</p> <p>The investigation revealed that the security guard was struck by the spinning propeller when he tried to go around the front of the aircraft to collect landing fees from the pilot.</p>					
SRP Date	11 August 2020		Publication Date	12 August 2020		

Reference Number : CA18/2/3/9799
Name of Owner/Operator : A. V. Worsdale
Manufacturer : Cessna Corporation
Model : C210T
Nationality : South African
Registration Marks : ZS-MGB
Place : Pongola, KwaZulu-Natal
Date : 3 July 2019
Time : 1145Z

All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.

Purpose of the Investigation:

*In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and **not to apportion blame or liability**.*

Investigations Process:

The accident was notified to the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) on 3 July 2019 at about 1200Z. The investigators dispatched to Pongola Aerodrome on 4 July 2019. The investigators co-ordinated with all authorities on site and initiated the accident investigation according to CAR Part 12 and investigation procedures. The AIID of the South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA) is leading the investigation as the Republic of South Africa is the State of Occurrence.

Notes:

1. Whenever the following words are mentioned in this report, they shall mean the following:

- Accident – this investigated accident*
- Aircraft – the Cessna 210T involved in this accident*
- Investigation – the investigation into the circumstances of this accident*
- Pilot – the pilot involved in this accident*
- Report – this accident report*

2. Photos and figures used in this report were taken from different sources and may be adjusted from the original for the sole purpose of improving clarity of the report. Modifications to images used in this report were limited to cropping, magnification, file compression; or enhancement of colour, brightness, contrast; or addition of text boxes, arrows or lines.

Disclaimer:

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1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1. History of Flight

1.1.1 On 3 July 2019, the pilot had intended to take-off on a private flight from Pongola Aerodrome (FAPL) to the Rand Aerodrome (FAGM). The aircraft, with registration marks ZS-MGB, is one of the few aircraft based at FAPL. On the day of the accident, the pilot stated that he arrived at the aerodrome and towed the aircraft out of its hangar to undertake the pre-flight checks before boarding and starting the engines. He further stated that he taxied to the beginning of the tarred taxiway where he carried out engine run-up checks in preparation for take-off.



Figure 1: The parked ZS-MGB aircraft.

1.1.2 While he was busy with the run-up checks, a security guard approached the aircraft from the right side. He was below the wing of the aircraft (Cessna 210 is a high-wing aircraft). The pilot was unaware of the guard at that time. Once the security guard realised that the pilot was seating on the left side of the aircraft, he started walking towards the front of the aircraft where he, inadvertently, walked into a spinning propeller which struck him several times. The security guard succumbed to his injuries before the emergency medical services arrived at the scene.

1.1.3 According to the security guard company management, the security guards were given an instruction by the local municipality to collect landing fees from visiting aircraft. The security guard company further stated that they had advised their security guards to wait for the pilots to disembark before approaching the aircraft to collect landing fees. This is contained in the list of their duties (Appendix A).

1.1.4 The local municipal manager indicated that the aircraft that use hangars at FAPL are exempted from paying landing fees (Appendix A). The security guard on duty, whom the investigating team interviewed at FAPL following the accident, was aware of the instruction as per their airport duties and as laid out in the Functional Projection Plan (Appendix A).

1.1.5 The security guard, who was struck by the propeller, had a Grade C security qualification and was on relief duty on the day of the accident. He was normally based at Phuzumile flea market as a security guard. The last time he worked at FAPL was in December 2018 for one day only and at the same area.




Figure 2: Pongola Aerodrome layout.

1.1.6 The accident happened during daylight at FAPL at the following Global Positioning System (GPS) co-ordinates: S27° 21' 59.77" E031° 36' 36.12" and at an elevation of 918.4 feet (ft).

1.2. Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Pilot	Crew	Pass.	Other
Fatal	-	-	-	1
Serious	-	-	-	-
Minor	-	-	-	-
None	1	-	-	-

1.2.1 The security guard suffered fatal injuries.

1.3. Damage to Aircraft

1.3.1 None.

1.4. Other Damage

1.4.1 None.

1.5. Personnel Information

Nationality	South African	Gender	Male	Age	65
Licence Number	0270226848	Licence Type	Private Pilot Licence		
Licence Valid	Yes	Type Endorsed	Yes		
Ratings	Night & Instrument				
Medical Expiry Date	31 October 2019				
Restrictions	Corrective lenses				
Previous Accidents	None				

Flying Experience:

Total Hours	1780.2
Total Past 90 Days	39.6
Total on Type Past 90 Days	39.6
Total on Type	1512.7

1.6. Aircraft Information

Airframe:

Type	Fixed wing	
Serial Number	210-64038	
Manufacturer	Cessna Aircraft Company	
Date of Manufacture	1980	
Total Airframe Hours (At time of Accident)	3236.1	
Last MPI (Date & Hours)	30 June 2019	3198.4
Hours Since Last MPI	37.7	
C of A (expiry date)	31 March 2020	
C of R (Issue Date) (Present owner)	19 July 1994	
Operating Categories	Standard	

Engine:

Type	Teledyne Continental
Serial Number	512290
Hours Since New	3236.1
Hours Since Overhaul	1004.7

Propeller:

Type	McCauley D3A3AC402
Serial Number	070409
Hours Since New	772.1
Hours Since Overhaul	124.1

1.7. Meteorological Information

1.7.1 The weather was provided by the pilot through a pilot questionnaire.

Wind direction	Light	Wind speed	Variable	Visibility	9999m
Temperature	25°	Cloud cover	Nil	Cloud base	Nil
Dew point	Unknown				

1.8. Aids to Navigation

1.8.1 The aircraft was equipped with standard navigational equipment as approved by the Regulator (SACAA). There were no recorded defects to the navigation equipment prior to the accident.

1.9. Communication

1.9.1 The aircraft was equipped with standard communication equipment as approved by the Regulator. There were no recorded defects to the communication system prior to the accident.

1.10. Aerodrome Information

Accident Site	Pongola Aerodrome	
Site Co-ordinates	S27° 21' 59" E031° 36' 36"	
Site Elevation	915,2 ft.	
Runway Designations	16/34	
Runway Dimensions	16/34	698m X 18m
Runway Used	34	
Runway Surface	Tar	
Approach Facilities	None	

1.10.1 The FAPL is licensed and the Regulator had made the following findings following the aerodrome's last audit on 8 September 2018:

- a) 1 major wind direction indicator not in order
- b) 1 severe finding: damaged aerodrome perimeter fence

1.10.2 The findings mentioned in paragraph 1.10.1 were not corrected at the time of this accident even though they had no bearing on the cause of accident.




Figure 3: Pongola Aerodrome chart.

1.10.3 Observations

1.10.3.1 The guard on duty post the accident was found not wearing a reflector jacket. When asked why he did not have the reflector jacket on, he responded that they only wear reflector jackets at night. This is in contravention of *CAR 2011, Part 139.02.23 (5) as amended*.

1.10.3.2 Supporting staff use a gate that is located on the northern side of the taxiway (Figure 2) when going to the shops. They cross the taxiway at any point as well as near the final approach for aircraft on Runway 34. This is in contravention of *CAR 2011, Part 139.01.29 (2C) as amended*.

1.10.3.3 There were no boards in the aerodrome or any additional information in the Pongola Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) informing visiting aircraft that landing fees must be paid at the guard house. This is in contravention of *CAR 2011, Part 139.02.11 (n) & (o) as amended*.

1.10.3.4 There were no designated run-up bays/areas and there were no signage boards prohibiting pedestrian movement or informing aerodrome supporting staff to stay away from areas where aircraft are being operated. This is in contravention of *CAR 2011, Part 139.01.25* as amended.

1.10.3.5 There were two gates at the aerodrome, one on the northern side which was closed but not locked; and the other, on the southern side which was permanently opened. This is in contravention of *CAR 2011, Part 139.02.28* as amended.

1.11. Flight Recorders

1.11.1 The aircraft was not equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or cockpit voice recorder (CVR), nor were they required by regulation to be fitted to this aircraft type.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information

1.12.1 The aircraft was stationary at the time of the accident. Engine run-up checks were being conducted when the aircraft's propeller fatally struck the security guard. There was no noticeable damage to the propeller after the accident.



Figure 4: The front view of the propeller with white stripes has better visibility when spinning. The inset shows the rear of the propeller with no white stripes, which makes it invisible when spinning.

1.12.2 The front part of the propeller has two colours (black and white stripes) for visibility. The inset (Figure 4) shows the back (rear) of the propeller which has only one colour, black. The back part is meant to be invisible when the blade is spinning; it does not obscure the pilot's view.

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information

1.13.1 The post-mortem and blood toxicology reports of the deceased security guard were still outstanding at the time of releasing this report. Should any of the results have a bearing on the circumstances leading to the accident, they will be treated as new evidence that will necessitate reopening of the investigation.

1.14 Fire

1.14.1 There was no evidence of a pre- or post-impact fire.

1.15 Survival Aspects

1.15.1 The accident was considered not survivable due to the injuries sustained by the security guard when he walked into the spinning propeller.

1.16 Tests and Research

1.16.1 Not applicable.

1.17 Organisational and Management Information

1.17.1 The aircraft was operated privately in accordance with Part 91 of the CAR 2011 as amended. The pilot was about to undertake a private flight to FAGM.

1.17.2 FAPL is managed by Pongola Municipality and the unit responsible for managing the aerodrome is the Community Services Department. The director appointed in that unit is the responsible person for the aerodrome, and he does not have any aviation background. The responsible person interacts with inspectors from the SACAA regarding aerodrome licence renewal. The requirements for a Category 1 licence are listed in Appendix B.

1.17.3 The security company contracted by the Pongola Municipality started working at the aerodrome on 1 September 2018. The security guards were given a safety induction, but the induction did not include critical safety knowledge such as when to give way to a moving aircraft or to be aware of all the hazards around the aerodrome. In the list of their

duties, it is stated that visiting aircraft will pay landing fees to the security guard on duty after landing. It also indicates that local flights do not pay landing fees (Appendix A).

1.17.4 The Regulator audited the aerodrome in September 2018 and had made several findings on the aerodrome infrastructure with emphasis on the runway and the perimeter fence. The aerodrome was issued an aerodrome licence to operate even though the findings were not addressed. Category 1 aerodrome audit is only limited to inspection of aerodrome facilities (see Appendix D – assessing aerodrome facilities and equipment).

1.18 Additional Information

1.18.1 There are four hangars at FAPL, however, the Pongola Municipality had no record or list of who the owner/s of the hangars were or how many aircraft were parked in each hangar.

1.18.2 The list of local aircraft was not posted on a notice board inside the security guards' house for them to reference which aircraft were exempted from paying landing fees. The investigating team asked the guard on duty after the accident what were they taught during induction in relation to aerodrome safety procedures. His response was that they should not approach a moving aircraft at the aerodrome. The attachment is an extract of the response provided by the Pongola Municipality regarding how the aerodrome is managed. A full list is attached as Appendix C.

- **What type of training or induction was given to the Security Personnel to enable them to operate at the Airport?**
 - i. To be alert and observant whilst on duty.
 - ii. To be aware of unsafety hazards when patrolling.
 - iii. To wash out their walk ways.
 - iv. To be aware of the slippery floor when patrolling.
 - v. To be aware of wild animals i.e. snakes ,insect bites and stray animals
 - vi. To be aware of any moving machinerles.

- **Was there any awareness training given to the Security Personnel to warn them about dangers safety at the Airport, specifically the runway and taxiway?**

Yes, it was part of the induction training

Figure 5: Pongola Aerodrome induction programme.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

1.19.1 None.

2. ANALYSIS

2.1. General

From the available evidence, the following analysis was made with respect to this accident. These shall not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

2.2. Analysis

2.2.1 The pilot was issued a Private Pilot Licence (PPL) on 30 October 2019 with an expiry date of 31 October 2020. His medical certificate was issued on 30 October 2019 with an expiry date of 31 October 2020; he had a restriction to wear corrective lenses.

2.2.2 The aircraft's last maintenance inspection was carried out by a certified aircraft maintenance organisation (AMO) No 149 which issued a certificate of release to service on 30 June 2019 at 3198.4 airframe hours. The aircraft had flown a further 37.7 hours before the accident.

2.2.3 The security guard was not a regular at this aerodrome; the day of the accident was his second day in seven months. According to the security company, he was given a safety briefing the first time he was rostered to give relief at FAPL, which was more than six months prior to the accident. The security guards are required by the municipality to collect landing fees from visiting aircraft and this is contained in the list of their duties. The Functional Project Plan (FPP) also advises the security guard that the landing fees will be paid at the security office. It further states that local aircraft are exempted from paying landing fees. The guard on duty post the accident did not know how many aircraft were "local" as well as their registration marks. The list of local aircraft and other safety warning should have been printed and attached to the notice board inside the guard house for ease of reference, but there was none; contravening *CAR 2011 Part 139.02.11 (n)&(o) as amended*.

2.2.4 The Functional Project Plan (FPP) says guards must always wear uniform but does not say anything about guards wearing a reflector jacket when moving around the aerodrome; contravening *CAR 2011 Part 139.02.23 (5) as amended*.

2.2.5 The aircraft and aerodrome personnel are forced to use the same taxiway to cross the water channel. There is no surface movement control to direct people away from the aircraft movement areas, which is in contravention of *Regulation Part 139.01.25* and *Regulation Part 139.02.28 (Appendix B)*. FAPL management (Pongola Municipality) was not aware of the requirements of CAR 2011 Part 139.

- 2.2.6 The Regulator audited the aerodrome on 8 September 2018 and had made several findings on the aerodrome infrastructure with the emphasis on the runway and the perimeter fence. At the time of the accident, the aerodrome operator had still not corrected the findings raised by the Regulator, however, the aerodrome was issued an aerodrome licence to operate.
- 2.2.7 The investigation revealed that the security guard was struck by the spinning propeller when he tried to go around to the left side of the aircraft to collect landing fees from the pilot.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1. General

From the available evidence, the following findings, causes and contributing factors were made with respect to this accident. These shall not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

To serve the objective of this investigation, the following sections are included in the conclusions heading:

- **Findings** — are statements of all significant conditions, events or circumstances in this accident. The findings are significant steps in this accident sequence, but they are not always causal or indicate deficiencies.
- **Causes** — are actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which led to this accident.
- **Contributing factors** — are actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability of the accident or incident occurring, or mitigated the severity of the consequences of the accident or incident. The identification of contributing factors does not imply the assignment of fault or the determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability.

3.2. Findings

3.2.1 The aircraft was certified and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and the aircraft maintenance records were up to date.

3.2.2 The pilot was issued a Private Pilot Licence (CPL) and the aircraft type was endorsed on his licence.

- 3.2.3 The pilot's medical certificate was issued on 30 October 2018 and was valid with restrictions.
- 3.2.4 FAPL management (Pongola Municipality) was not aware of the CAR 2011 Part 139 which regulates how a Category I aerodrome should be managed; the regulation does not require any person responsible for Category I aerodrome to have knowledge of CAR Part 139.
- 3.2.5 FAPL was licensed and had had its last audit conducted on 8 September 2018 in which the Regulator issued some findings which the aerodrome's operator was supposed to have corrected. However, at the time of this accident, the operator had not corrected the findings issued by the Regulator.
- 3.2.6 The Pongola Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) did not inform pilots on how the landing fees would be collected; contravening CAR 2011, Part 139.02.11 (n)&(o) as amended.
- 3.2.7 There were no clear markings on the ground as well as no boards informing and restricting the support staff that they must remain clear of the marked area/s when an aircraft is present; contravening CAR 2011, Part 139.01.32 (1) as amended.
- 3.2.8 There are two gates at the aerodrome, one on the northern side which was closed but not locked, and the other, on the southern side that is used by pedestrians to enter from the south and which is permanently opened. This posed danger to people, animals and aircraft alike; contravening CAR 2011, Part 139.02.28 as amended.
- 3.2.9 The Regulator audited the aerodrome in September 2018 and had made several findings on the aerodrome infrastructure with the emphasis on the runway and the perimeter fence. At the time of the accident, the aerodrome operator had still not corrected the findings raised by the Regulator.
- 3.2.10 The investigation revealed that the security guard was struck by the spinning propeller when he tried to go around to the left side of the aircraft to collect landing fees from the pilot.

3.3. Probable Cause/s

- 3.3.1 The security guard was struck by the spinning propeller when he tried to go around to the left side of the aircraft to collect landing fees from the pilot.

3.4. Contributory Factors

- 3.4.1 The security guard was not familiar with the aerodrome's safety requirements.
- 3.4.2 The security guard's lack of proper aerodrome safety training.

3.4.3 Failure of the aerodrome operator to correct the findings issued by the Regulator.

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. General

The safety recommendations listed in this report are proposed according to paragraph 6.8 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and are based on the conclusions listed in heading 3 of this report; the AIID expects that all safety issues identified by the investigation are addressed by the receiving States and organisations.

4.2. Safety Recommendation/s

4.2.1 Safety Message: it is advisable that the aerodrome operator appoints a safety officer who will solely be responsible for the aerodrome safety and provide safety briefings and training to all aerodrome personnel.

4.2.2 It is recommended that the FAPL amends its AIP information and include a new procedure of paying landing fees.

4.2.3 It is recommended that the DCA reviews the requirements of Category 1 and Category 2 aerodrome restricted areas in respect of clear markings on the ground and boards prohibiting any pedestrians from approaching an aircraft in the restricted area, even though they do not have to meet the requirements of the CAR 2011 Part 139. The aerodrome did not have markings for restricted areas which could have reduced the risk/chance of this fatal accident occurring.

4.2.4 It is recommended that the DCA reviews the current practise of the aerodrome operator in respect of aerodrome safety briefings of security personnel, as well as require the aerodrome operator to establish a safety procedure for personnel (security) when they have been away from the aerodrome for longer than three (3) months.


4.2.5 It is also recommended that the DCA reviews the current practise of the aerodrome operator in respect of collection of landing fees as well as require that the aerodrome operator put in place measures or procedures that will allow the aircraft operators to pay landing fees at the security offices after landing, and not for the security personnel to collect the landing fees from aircraft operators.

5. APPENDICES

- 5.1 The Functional Project Plan (FPP) – Appendix A
- 5.2 The SACAA Civil Aviation Regulations – Appendix B
- 5.3 Pongola Municipality response – Appendix C
- 5.4 Technical Guidance Material (TGM) for aerodrome licencing: Assessing aerodrome facilities and equipment – Appendix D

This Report is issued by:

**Accident and Incident Investigations Division
South African Civil Aviation Authority
Republic of South Africa**



V1 SECURITY SERVICES
Cl.: 2014/040472/07 Psira : 2389291

Tel : 035 474 0020
Fax : 035 474 0255
Fax : 086 459 7652
Cell : 076 060 0161
Email : info@v1security.co.za
Website : www.v1security.co.za


P.O. Box 811
Eshowe
3815

7 Osborn Road
Office 4 & 5
Eshowe, 3815

DUTIES OF THE SECURITY OFFICERS AT PONGOLA AIR STRIP

- All security officers will be in full uniform, clean, good shaven and neatly dressed.
- All security officers will read understand and obey the job description (site instructions for the post Security officers must report for their duties 15 minutes before their shift start in order to do their proper handing over.
- All security officers will report for their duties physical fit as they understand hazards of a person who will be under influence of liquor or any habit drugs.
- They will sign on duty in the occurrence book (OB) at the beginning of each shift and off duty, when relieved or leaving the site.
- Security officers must be alert and observant whilst on duty at all times.
- Incident and accident will be reported during the time of their occurrence and when are noted.
- The flights for visitors are going to pay landing fees at the security on duty after landed the receipt must be issued thereof to the pilot.
- The landing fees is determine by the mass of the visitor's flight.

2



V1 SECURITY SERVICES
Cl.: 2014/040472/07 Psira : 2389291

Tel : 035 474 0020
Fax : 035 474 0255
Fax : 086 459 7652
Cell : 076 060 0161
Email : info@v1security.co.za
Website : www.v1security.co.za

P.O. Box 811
Eshowe
3815

7 Osborn Road
Office 4 & 5
Eshowe, 3815

- Landing fees will be collected by the supervisor in order to be handed to municipal HOD in charge.
- Local flights pilots are not paying any fees.
- Any strange person or suspicious movement must be reported to V1 security supervisor for further investigation.
- The security officers must check doors and windows during his patrol.
- Any irregularities must be recorded down in a OB book
- Security officers must report to V1 control room by using two way radio for situation report.

Appendix B

139.01.25 No person shall test-run an aircraft engine on a licensed aerodrome or heliport except at a place designated for the purpose by the aerodrome or heliport operator.

139.01.29 (2C) No person shall on a licensed aerodrome or a licensed or approved heliport walk or drive across any live taxiway or runway

139.02.11 (n) safety procedures pertaining to all apron operations that are carried out on the aerodrome; and (o) All pertinent information on the aerodrome site, facilities, services, equipment, operating procedures, organisation and management including a safety management system.

139.02.23 (5) A holder of an aerodrome licence shall determine procedures to ensure that personnel operating on airside wear high visibility clothing at all times whilst on airside.

139.02.28 Control of entry into restricted area

(1) A holder of an aerodrome licence shall exercise control over entry into a restricted area according to the procedures and criteria approved by such holder.

(2) An authorised officer, inspector or authorised person may—

(a) prohibit any person from entering a restricted area; or

(b) order any person to leave a restricted area immediately, whether such person has been granted permission to be within a restricted area or not.

(3) A fence or other suitable barrier or procedure shall be provided on an aerodrome in an environmental protected area in order to—

(a) prevent the entrance to the movement area of animals large enough to be a hazard to aircraft; and

(b) deter the inadvertent or premeditated access of an unauthorised person onto a non-public area of an aerodrome.

Aerodrome rescue and firefighting

139.02.15 (1) An applicant for, or a holder of an aerodrome licence with a Category higher than 2 shall ensure that an aerodrome is provided with a rescue and firefighting service capable of providing the required level of protection necessary for maintaining the minimum level of protection required for the appropriate category of aerodrome

139.02.30 Safety measures against fire

(1) A holder of an aerodrome licence shall establish preventative measures against possible fires on the aerodrome and identify a person or group or persons in writing to maintain a fire prevention programme for an aerodrome and aerodrome buildings.

(2) If the aerodrome has no fire brigade service designated in terms of the Fire Brigade Services Act. 1987 (Act No. 99 of 1987), the holder of an aerodrome licence shall arrange with the local government concerned to maintain a fire prevention programme for aerodrome buildings on landside and to advise such holder of any dangerous conditions for rectification.

(3) Unless the local authority's persons received airside induction training, aerodrome rescue and firefighting services provider shall be responsible to ensure that fire prevention on airside is maintained, and shall keep proper record of inspections performed and rectification measures instituted.

(4) A holder of an aerodrome licence shall ensure that no unsafe practice is performed on an aerodrome or within its parameters.

(5) If unsafe practices have to be performed during any day-to-day maintenance of, or on, an aerodrome, a holder of an aerodrome licence shall alert the rescue and firefighting service provider concerned to be on standby for the duration of such practices.

Questions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <p>• Who is the responsible person for the Aerodrome / Airport? In terms of the organogram of the Municipality, the Aerodrome is residing in the Community Services Department, and the Director is a responsible person.</p> <p>• What was the criteria used to appoint Security Company? Due Supply Chain Management, processes were followed in the appointment of the Security Company. The Appointment was done through MFMA Provision that allows the urgent appointment of Service Provider</p> <p>• Was there any criteria that was not met by the existing Security Company, if yes, how was it resolved? NO, the Service Provider was originally appointed for VIP Security which was then extended to general security. When we have delays in concluding our Supply Chain Management processes to appoint a service provider.</p> <p>• What is his/her aviation background? <i>It was not his first time to perform his duties at Pongola air strip, as he was performing the same duties under his previous employer at the very same site.</i></p> <p>• What is the Job Description of the Security Officer?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Guarding the site. ii. Incident and accident must be reported during the time of their occurrence and when are noted. iii. To collect landing fees when paid at them. iv. To report any irregularities. v. To report any strange person, suspicious person and criminal activities. <p>• Was collecting landing fees part of their responsibilities? If yes, how were they trained? Yes, collecting landing fees was part of the incumbent responsibilities.</p> <p>• Is there a Committee appointed to oversee the running of the Airport? If not, why? No Committee appointed. This facility belongs to the Municipality and its operations belong to the portfolio committees like other facilities owned by the municipality does not have separate committee.</p>

- **Out of the 04 Airport Residents, how many more are not paying the landing fees?**

Only these Airport Residents who do not pay the landing fees

- **What type of training or induction was given to the Security Personnel to enable them to operate at the Airport?**

- To be alert and observant whilst on duty.
- To be aware of unsafety hazards when patrolling.
- To wash out their walk ways.
- To be aware of the slippery floor when patrolling.
- To be aware of wild animals i.e. snakes ,insect bites and stray animals
- To be aware of any moving machineries.

- **Was there any awareness training given to the Security Personnel to warn them about dangers safety at the Airport, specifically the runway and taxiway?**

Yes, it was part of the induction training

We wish to indicate our cooperation in respect of any enquiry regarding this matter.

Yours faithfully



The Municipal Manager

Appendix D

5.3 Phase 3: Assessing the Aerodrome facilities and equipment

5.3.1 An on-site inspection shall be undertaken by CAA aerodrome inspectors for the purpose of assessing the aerodrome facilities, services and equipment to verify and ensure that they comply with the specified standards and requirements.

5.3.2 The on-site inspection shall include:

5.3.2.1 On-site verification of aerodrome data; and

5.3.2.2 Checking of aerodrome facilities and equipment, which shall include:

- a) dimensions and surface conditions of:
 - runway(s);
 - runway shoulders;
 - runway strip(s);
 - runway end safety areas;
 - stopway(s) and clearways;
 - taxiway(s);
 - taxiway shoulders;
 - taxiway strips; and
 - aprons;
- b) the presence of obstacles in obstacle limitation surfaces at and in the vicinity of the aerodrome;
- c) the following aeronautical ground lights, including their flight check records:
 - runway and taxiway lighting
 - approach lights;
 - PAPI/APAPI or T-VASIS/AT-VASIS;
 - apron floodlighting;
 - obstacle lighting;
 - pilot-activated lighting, if applicable; and visual docking guidance systems;
- d) standby power;
- e) wind direction indicator(s);
- f) illumination of the wind direction indicator(s);
- g) aerodrome markings and markers;
- h) signs in the movement areas;
- i) tie-down points for aircraft;

- j) ground earthing points;
- k) rescue and fire-fighting
- l) equipment and installations;
- m) aerodrome maintenance equipment, particularly for the airside facilities maintenance including runway surface friction measurement;
- n) runway sweepers;
- o) disabled aircraft removal equipment;
- p) wildlife management procedures and equipment;
- q) two-way radios installed in vehicles for use by the aerodrome operator in the movement area;
- r) the presence of lights that may endanger the safety of aircraft; and
- s) fuelling facilities.