



Airworthiness Directive

AD No.: 2018-0240

Issued: 07 November 2018

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1139 on behalf of the European Union, its Member States and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 129 of that Regulation.

This AD is issued in accordance with Regulation (EU) 748/2012, Part 21.A.3B. In accordance with Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.301, the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person may operate an aircraft to which an AD applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that AD, unless otherwise specified by the Agency [Regulation (EU) 1321/2014 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the Authority of the State of Registry [Regulation (EU) 2018/1139, Article 71 exemption].

Design Approval Holder's Name:

SAAB AB

Type/Model designation(s):

SAAB 2000 aeroplanes

Effective Date: 21 November 2018

TCDS Number(s): EASA.A.069

Foreign AD: Not applicable

Supersedure: None

ATA 22 – Auto Flight – Autopilot Disconnect Logic – Modification

Manufacturer(s):

SAAB AB (SAAB), formerly Saab Aircraft AB

Applicability:

SAAB 2000 aeroplanes, all serial numbers.

Definitions:

For the purpose of this AD, the following definitions apply:

The SB: SAAB Service Bulletin (SB) 2000-22-008.

Reason:

An occurrence was reported concerning a SAAB 2000 aeroplane, which was struck by lightning following a discontinued approach, with the auto-pilot (AP) engaged. After the lightning strike, the wings rolled level and the flight crew decided to climb but the aeroplane did not respond to flight control inputs as expected. Contrary to flight crew understanding, the pitch trim switches had not disengaged the AP and the flight crew attempts to override the AP inputs resulted in a temporary loss of control of the aeroplane.

This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further events where, without the flight crew being aware, the AP remains engaged, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane.



Prompted by these findings, SAAB redesigned the AP disconnect logic, ensuring that the AP disconnects when either of the two main pitch trim switches on each control wheel are operated. SAAB also issued the SB, providing modification instructions.

For the reason described above, this AD requires a change to the AP disconnect logic by modification of the wiring installation.

Required Action(s) and Compliance Time(s):

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously:

Modification:

Within 3 000 flight hours or 24 months, whichever occurs first after the effective date of this AD, modify the AP disconnect logic in accordance with the instructions of the SB.

Ref. Publications:

SAAB SB 2000-22-008 original issue dated 15 June 2018.

The use of later approved revisions of the above-mentioned document is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD.

Remarks:

1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD.
2. This AD was posted on 05 October 2018 as PAD 18-136 for consultation until 02 November 2018. No comments were received during the consultation period.
3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the EASA Safety Information Section, Certification Directorate. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.
4. Information about any failures, malfunctions, defects or other occurrences, which may be similar to the unsafe condition addressed by this AD, and which may occur, or have occurred on a product, part or appliance not affected by this AD, can be reported to the [EU aviation safety reporting system](#).
5. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements in this AD, please contact: SAAB AB, Support and Services, SE-581 88 Linköping, Sweden, E-mail: Saab2000.techsupport@saabgroup.com.

