



Safety Information Bulletin

Operations

SIB No.: 2015-16R3

Issued: 31 August 2020

Subject: Simferopol Flight Information Region

Revision:

This SIB revises EASA SIB 2015-16R2 dated 17 February 2016.

Ref. Publications:

- Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC) 02/20 published by Aeronautical Information Service of Ukraine.
- Safety case regarding provision of air navigation services within Ukrainian airspace and airspace over the high seas where the responsibility for Air Traffic Services (ATS) is delegated to Ukraine by international agreements published by Ukrainian State Air Traffic Services Enterprise (UKSATSE) on 09 June 2015.
- Safety case regarding changes related to the implementation of phase 1.B concerning the establishment of the availability of the ATS route network and flight planning procedures in the western part of the airspace over the high seas within UTA ODESA-SOUTH published by UKSATSE on 23 January 2020.
- Post implementation monitoring report on safety and utilization of ATS routes available for flight planning within airspace over high seas where responsibility for ATS is delegated to Ukraine by international agreements – transmitted by the State Aviation Administration of Ukraine (SAAU) to EASA on 09 December 2015.

Applicability:

National Aviation Authorities and aircraft operators.

Description:

SAAU has published AIC 02/20 effective as of 30 January 2020, which states that segments of six ATS routes within Simferopol Flight Information Region (FIR) over the high seas within UTA ODESA-SOUTH are available for flight planning and operations of civil aircraft operators. Associated notices to airmen (NOTAM) have also been issued.

The responsibility for air traffic services in the high seas portion of Simferopol FIR was delegated to Ukraine by regional air navigation agreements as approved by ICAO Council Decision of 17 February 1997. Therefore, Ukraine is the only internationally recognised State for providing ATS within Simferopol FIR and for publishing aeronautical information (e.g. NOTAM, AIC, Aeronautical Information Publication amendments) concerning Simferopol FIR.

EASA has reviewed the safety cases provided by Ukraine that underlies this proposal for ATS routes availability and other relevant information, such as:

This is information only. Recommendations are not mandatory.



- Russian aeronautical publications, including the recently updated AIC issued by Aeronautical Information Service of Federal Air Transport Agency of Russia, which is conflicting with Ukraine AIC 02/20, claiming that the six segments or ATS routes mentioned in Ukraine AIC 02/20 are under control of Simferopol Air Traffic Management Centre;
- Information on actual Air Traffic in the Simferopol FIR.

Note: In accordance with ICAO Council Decision of 17 February 1997, the Russian Federation is not internationally recognised to provide services within Simferopol FIR and therefore Aeronautical Information Service of Federal Air Transport Agency of Russia with regard to Simferopol FIR are not internationally recognised.

Furthermore, EASA has reviewed the post implementation monitoring report that has been approved by SAAU, and monthly updates of post implementation monitoring reports since February 2016.

The current results of EASA's review of the overall situation can be summarised as described below:

- a) A potential for safety risks is generated by the following:
 - a. the existence of aeronautical publications from the Russian Federation which is not internationally recognised as the State responsible to provide air traffic services in the airspace over the high seas portion of Simferopol FIR;
 - b. the absence of agreement or coordination mechanisms between the two countries for the provision of ATS services in the portion of airspace under consideration;
 - c. the existence of dangerous areas below some of the routes under consideration, without evidence of direct coordination regarding the activation of those areas.

- b) Nevertheless, a robust framework for monitoring the effectiveness of the risk mitigation measures documented in the safety case have been put in place by UKSATSE and SAAU as part of their post implementation monitoring system. The outcome of post implementation monitoring shows that the risk mitigations put in place are effective and that no incident with adverse safety impact was reported during the period of time under study.

In conclusion, EASA assesses that safety conditions have sufficiently improved within the Simferopol FIR, allowing to reconsider the area of hazard to civil aviation. However, in specified areas of the Simferopol FIR, EASA estimates that continuing hazards to civil aviation remain, due to potential conflicting air navigation service providers guidance, and thereby proposes to retain a phased approach to the utilisation of the airspace in Simferopol FIR.

EASA continues to monitor closely the situation and will amend this SIB, as required.

Recommendation(s):

EASA invites airspace users to consider the use of ATS routes L851 'KUGOS-ADINA', M435 'LAROM-RASIL', M856 'RAKUR-DIGAM', M861 'RAKUR-BIRMA', M860 'DIGAM-KUGOS' and M854 'RASIL-SUMOL', when planning flights within the Simferopol FIR, and to take into account the relevant aeronautical information published by Ukraine.

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It is further recommended to share any relevant information, especially in case of occurrences, with EASA. Such information can be sent to report@easa.europa.eu.

Contact(s):

For further information contact the EASA Programming and Continued Airworthiness Information Section, Certification Directorate, E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu.

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