



AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

				Reference:		CA18/2/3/10621	
Aircraft Registration	ZU-FWF	Date of Incident	30 November 2025		Time of Incident	0905Z	
Type of Aircraft	Sling 2 LSA			Type of Operation	Private (Part 94)		
Pilot-in-command Licence Type		National Pilot Licence (NPL)		Age	67	Licence Valid	Yes
Pilot-in-command Flying Experience		Total Flying Hours		1 862.2	Hours on Type	Unknown	
Last Point of Departure		Morningstar Airfield, Western Cape Province					
Next Point of Intended Landing		Morningstar Airfield, Western Cape Province					
Damage to Aircraft		Destroyed					
Location of the incident site with reference to easily defined geographical points (GPS readings if possible)							
Bush-type of terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road, approximately 150 metres (m) south-east of Morningstar Airfield at Global Positioning System (GPS) co-ordinates determined to be 33°45'52" South 18°33'0" East.							
Meteorological Information		Surface wind: 180°/11kts; Temperature: 25°C; Dew point: 11°C; CAVOK					
Number of People On-board	2+0	Number of People Injured	0	Number of People Killed	2	Other (On the Ground)	0

Synopsis

On Sunday, 30 November 2025, two pilots on-board a Sling 2 Light Sport Aircraft (LSA) with registration ZU-FWF were engaged in a private (acceptance) flight from Morningstar Airfield near Philadelphia, Western Cape province, with the intention to land at the same airfield when the accident occurred. The owner of the aircraft stated that there was a sale agreement of the aircraft between himself and a prospective buyer from Chief Dawid Stuurman International Airport (FAPE) in Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape province. A detailed pre-flight inspection of the aircraft was conducted by both pilots and no anomalies were cited. The aircraft had a total of 60 litres (L) of Motor Gasoline (Mogas) in the tanks. The pilot representing the owner occupied the left seat and was the pilot flying (PF); the pilot representing the buyer occupied the right seat and was the pilot monitoring (PM). The PF started the engine and taxied the aircraft to the threshold of Runway 20. After the completion of the pre-take-off checks, the PF opened the throttle to full power and commenced with the take-off run.

The owner of the aircraft was in the clubhouse; he watched as the aircraft took off. He stated that the windsock indicated a strong headwind at take-off. The aircraft rotated and executed a rapid steep climb; after passing the threshold of the opposite runway (Runway 02) at approximately 250 feet (ft) above ground level (AGL), it commenced a left turn during which it descended in a nose-down attitude and crashed on a bush-type terrain approximately 150 metres (m) south-east of Morningstar Airfield. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces; both pilots were fatally injured. Post-accident investigation found water contamination in the fuel and corrosion in the carburettor float bowls.

Probable Cause

Loss of engine power during take-off from Runway 20 likely due to water-contaminated fuel and corrosion found in the carburettor float bowls; the aircraft crashed on a bush-type terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road, approximately 150m south-east of Morningstar Airfield.

SRP Date

9 June 2026

Publication Date

11 June 2026

Occurrence Details

Reference Number : CA18/2/3/10621
Occurrence Category : Category 1 (Accident)
Type of Operation : Private (Part 94)
Name of Operator : Coenrad Ernest Birkenstock
Aircraft Registration : ZU-FWF
Aircraft Make and Model : Sling 2 LSA
Nationality : South African
Place : Bush-type of terrain, approximately 150 metres south-east of Morningstar Airfield
Date and Time : 30 November 2025 at 0905Z
Injuries : Two fatalities
Damage : Destroyed

Purpose of the Investigation

In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.

All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.

Investigation Process

The Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) was notified of the occurrence on 30 November 2025 at 0905Z. The occurrence was classified as an accident according to the CAR 2011 Part 12 and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) STD Annex 13 definitions. The notifications were sent to the State of Registry, Operator, and Design and Manufacturer in accordance with the CAR 2011 Part 12 and the ICAO Annex 13 Chapter 4.

Notes:

- 1. Whenever the following words are mentioned in this report, they shall mean the following:
Accident — this investigated accident
Aircraft — the Sling 2 LSA involved in this accident
Investigation — the investigation into the circumstances of this accident
Pilot — the pilot involved in this accident
Report — this accident report*
- 2. Photos and figures used in this report were taken from different sources and may have been adjusted from the original for the sole purpose of improving clarity of the report. Modifications to images used in this report were limited to cropping, magnification, file compression; or enhancement of colour, brightness, contrast; or addition of text boxes, arrows, or lines.*

Disclaimer

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Abbreviation	Description
°	Degrees
°C	Degrees Celsius
AGL	Above Ground Level
AIID	Accident and Incident Investigations Division
AMO	Aircraft Maintenance Organisation
AME	Aircraft Maintenance Engineer
ATO	Aviation Training Organisation
CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CCTV	Close Circuit Television
CB	Circuit Breaker
C of A	Certificate of Airworthiness
C of R	Certificate of Registration
CRS	Certificate of Release to Service
EFIS	Electronic Flight Instrument System
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
FAPE	Chief David Stuurman International Airport
FACT	Cape Town International Airport
FAWB	Wonderboom Airport
FDR	Flight Data Recorder
Ft	Feet
GPS	Global Positioning System
hPa	Hectopascal
IIC	Investigator-in-Charge
IAW	In Accordance With
Kt	Knots
LAS	Light Sport Aircraft
LCD	Liquid Crystal Display
L	Litres
M	Metres
METAR	Meteorological Routine Aerodrome Report
MHz	Megahertz
NM	Nautical Mile
NPL	National Pilot Licence
POH	Pilot Operating Handbook
PPL	Private Pilot Licence

PF	Pilot Flying
PM	Pilot Monitoring
SACAA	South African Civil Aviation Authority
SAWS	South African Weather Service
SD	Secure Digital Card
SAPS	South African Police Services
TBO	Time between Overhaul
UTC	Co-ordinated Universal Time
VMC	Visual Meteorological Conditions
QNH	Altitude Above Mean Sea Level
Z	Zulu (Term for Universal Co-ordinated Time - Zero Hours Greenwich)

FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1. History of Flight

- 1.1.1. On Sunday, 30 November 2025, two pilots on-board a Sling 2 Light Sport Aircraft (LSA) with registration ZU-FWF were engaged in a private (acceptance) flight from Morningstar Airfield near Philadelphia, Western Cape province, with the intention to land at the same airfield. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Part 94 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, as amended.
- 1.1.2. According to the owner of the aircraft, there was a sale agreement between himself and a prospective buyer from Chief Dawid Stuurman International Airport (FAPE) in Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape province. The purchasing of the aircraft was to be facilitated by a salesperson from Johannesburg (JHB), Gauteng province. On Sunday morning, the pilot representing the owner brought with him Motor Gasoline (Mogas) in jerricans from an unknown source, which was uploaded to the tanks; the aircraft fuel gauge indicated a total of 86 litres (L) after the upload. The pilot representing the owner conducted a pre-flight inspection of the aircraft and nothing abnormal was found. The aircraft's technical documentation had no outstanding defects or deferred items. Later, the pilot started the engine and taxied the aircraft to the threshold of Runway 20, whereafter he took off. He conducted three touch-and-go landings followed by a full-stop landing on the same runway. He then parked the aircraft next to the clubhouse. The same morning, the buyer brought with him a pilot, and they were joined by the salesperson; the intention was to ferry the aircraft to FAPE after the acceptance flight was conducted and signed off.
- 1.1.3. The aircraft was towed to the hangar where a detailed inspection was conducted by both pilots in the presence of the prospective buyer and the salesperson. According to the salesperson, nothing of concern was raised with the aircraft and technical documentation. The salesperson stated that the aircraft fuel gauge indicated a total of 60L in the tanks. The last page of the aircraft flight folio with serial number 257217 had no evidence of fuel replenishment on 30 November 2025. (The flight that was conducted in the morning was also not recorded, which was in contravention of Part 91.03.5 [1] and Part 91.03.6 [1] of the South African Civil aviation [SACAA] regulations).
- 1.1.4. The pilots later boarded the aircraft after they were satisfied with its condition. The pilot representing the owner occupied the left seat and was the pilot flying (PF). The pilot representing the buyer occupied the right seat and was the pilot monitoring (PM). The PF started the engine and allowed it to run for a while until all the parameters were within the normal operating limits. The owner, the prospective buyer and the salesperson went to the clubhouse's cafeteria and watched as the aircraft took off.
- 1.1.5. The PF taxied the aircraft to the threshold of Runway 20. After a few seconds, the PF opened the throttle to full power and commenced with the take-off run. According to the owner, the

windsock alongside the runway indicated a strong headwind. After rotation, the aircraft executed a rapid steep climb; it flew over the threshold of the opposite runway (Runway 02). At approximately 250 feet (ft) above ground level (AGL), the aircraft executed a left turn. A few seconds later, the PF was heard broadcasting on ground frequency 126.8-Megahertz (MHz) informing pilots in an aircraft that was in the holding point of Runway 20 to remain where they were as he was turning back (with a possible engine defect). The aircraft descended in a nose-down attitude and crashed on a bush-type terrain, approximately 150 metres (m) south-east of Morningstar Airfield. The pilots were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces. The South African Police Service (SAPS), Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel and the firefighting department from the City of Cape Town Metropolitan were notified about the accident and they responded promptly.

1.1.6. The accident occurred on a bush-type terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road, approximately 150m south-east of Morningstar Airfield at Global Positioning System (GPS) co-ordinates determined to be 33°45'52" South 18°33'0" East, at an elevation of 157ft.



Figure 1: An aerial view of the approximate accident site south-east of Morningstar Airfield (yellow pin) near Van Schoorsdrift Road. (Source: Google Earth)

1.2. Injuries to Persons

Injuries	Pilot	Crew	Pass.	Total On-board	Other
Fatal	2	-	-	2	-
Serious	-	-	-	-	-
Minor	-	-	-	-	-
None	-	-	-	-	-
Total	2	-	-	2	-

Note: Other means people on the ground.

1.3. Damage to Aircraft

1.3.1. The aircraft was destroyed during the accident sequence.



Figure 2: The aircraft at the accident site.

1.4. Other Damage

1.4.1. None.

1.5. Personnel Information

Pilot Flying (PF)

Nationality	South African	Gender	Male	Age	67
Licence Type	National Pilot Licence (NPL)				
Licence Valid	Yes	Type Endorsed	Yes		
Ratings	National Test Flight Ratings – LSA				
Medical Expiry Date	26 September 2026				
Restrictions	Wear suitable corrective lenses for defective distant, intermediate and near vision				
Previous Accidents	None				

Note: Previous accidents refer to past accidents the pilot was involved in, when relevant to this accident.

Flying Experience:

Total Hours	1 862.2
Total Past 24 Hours	Unknown
Total Past 7 Days	Unknown
Total Past 90 Days	22.2
Total on Type Past 90 Days	4.6
Total on Type	Unknown

- 1.5.1. The investigation team made efforts to obtain the PF's physical logbook but without success. The total hours shown above were obtained from a copy of the PF's logbook that was at the aviation training organisation (ATO) facility at Morningstar Airfield. The last entry in the logbook was recorded on 12 July 2025.
- 1.5.2. The pilot had a National Pilot Licence (NPL) that was initially issued on 10 December 2015 in accordance with (IAW) Part 61 of the CAR 2011. The licence was revalidated on 17 July 2025 with an expiry date of 14 July 2027. The pilot had the aircraft type (Sling 2 LSA) endorsed in his licence.
- 1.5.3. The pilot had a Class 4 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 6 September 2024 with an expiry date of 26 September 2026. The pilot had a restriction to wear suitable corrective lenses for defective distant, intermediate and near vision.

Pilot Monitoring (PM)

Nationality	South African	Gender	Male	Age	21
Licence Type	Private Pilot Licence (PPL)				
Licence Valid	Yes	Type Endorsed	Yes		
Ratings	Night Rating				
Medical Expiry Date	28 February 2030				
Restrictions	None				
Previous Accidents	None				

Note: Previous accidents refer to past accidents the pilot was involved in, when relevant to this accident.

Flying Experience:

Total Hours	203.4
Total Past 24 Hours	0
Total Past 7 Days	0
Total Past 90 Days	35
Total on Type Past 90 Days	10.8
Total on Type	10.8

1.6. Aircraft Information

1.6.1. Aircraft Description (Source: Pilot's Operating Handbook [POH])

1.6.2. *The Sling 2 LSA is a two-seat (side-by-side), single-engine aircraft of semi monocoque construction. The aircraft is powered by a four cylinder, four-stroke, four cylinders horizontally opposed spark ignition Rotax 912 ULS engine with one central camshaft pushrod. The engine features liquid cooled cylinder heads with ram air cooled cylinders. It comprised of a dry sump forced lubrication and had a dual contactless capacitor discharge magneto type ignition system. Each ignition system had its own control unit, ignition coils and spark plugs. The engine also comprised a mechanical fuel pump and a backup electrical fuel pump. The aircraft is fitted with the MGL Avionics Stratomaster Voyager electronic flight instrument system (EFIS). The EFIS integrates and displays the flight information on a multi-colour liquid crystal display (LCD) screen including airspeed, altitude, magnetic compass, turn-rate, slip/skid ball, bank angle and vertical speed.*



Figure 3: The file picture of the aircraft. (Source: jetphotos.com)



Figure 4: The ZU-FWF cockpit showing the Stratomaster Voyager MGL Avionics EFIS.

Airframe:

Manufacturer/Model	The Airplane Factory / Sling 2 LSA	
Serial Number	020	
Year of Manufacture	2013	
Total Airframe Hours (At Time of Serious Incident)	695.5	
Last Annual Inspection (Date & Hours)	21 October 2025	639.0
Airframe Hours Since Last Inspection	0.50	
CRS Issue Date	21 October 2025	
Authority-to-Fly (Issue Date & Expiry Date)	24 November 2025	30 September 2026

C of R (Issue Date) (Present Owner)	28 June 2022
Operating Category	Private (Part 94)
Type of Fuel Used	Mogas
Previous Accidents	None

Note: Previous accidents refer to past accidents the aircraft was involved in, when relevant to this accident.

Engine:

Manufacturer/Model	Bombardier – Rotax GMBH / 912 ULS
Serial Number	4428168
Part Number	912 ULS
Hours Since New	764.2
Hours Since Overhaul	Time between Overhaul (TBO) is 1 500 hours / TBO not reached

Propeller:

Manufacturer/Model	Warp Drive / Unknown
Serial Number	C13495
Part Number	Unknown
Hours Since New	639.0
Hours Since Overhaul	The Warp Drive propeller does not have the specified / mandatory TBO interval; they operate on a condition-based maintenance philosophy

1.6.3. The aircraft had a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) that was issued on 29 September 2025 with an expiry date of 28 September 2026 or at 5 390.4 hours, whichever occurs first.

1.7. Meteorological Information

1.7.1. The weather information below was obtained from the Cape Town International Airport (FACT) weather station on 30 November 2025 at 1030Z. The approximate accident site was 14.5 nautical miles (nm) from FACT.

Wind Direction	180°	Wind Speed	11kt	Visibility	9 999m
Temperature	25°C	Cloud Cover	Nil	Cloud Base	Nil
Dew Point	11°C	QNH	1014hPa		

1.8. Aids to Navigation

1.8.1. The aircraft was equipped with standard navigational equipment as approved by the Regulator (SACAA). There were no records indicating that the navigational equipment was unserviceable prior to the flight.

1.9. Communication

1.9.1. The aircraft was equipped with a standard communication system as approved by the Regulator (SACAA). There were no recorded defects with the communication system prior to the flight.

1.10. Aerodrome Information

1.10.1. The accident occurred on a bush-type terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road, approximately 150m south-east of Morningstar Airfield.

Aerodrome Location	Morningstar Airfield
Aerodrome Status	Licensed
Aerodrome GPS coordinates	S33°45'.32" E018°32'.54"
Aerodrome Elevation	200 ft
Runway Headings	045° / 225°
Dimensions of Runway Used	645 metres (m) x 12m
Runway Designations	02/20
Heading of Runway Used	225°
Surface of Runway Used	Asphalt
Approach Facilities	None
Radio Frequency	126.8-MHz

1.11. Flight Recorders

1.11.1. The aircraft was neither equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), nor was it required by regulation to be fitted to the aircraft type.

1.11.2. The aircraft was equipped with an old model MGL Avionics Stratomaster Voyager EFIS unit. The unit sustained impact damage during the accident sequence. The Secure Digital (SD) card was ejected during the accident; however, it was later found intact. The SD card that

was recovered from the aircraft did not contain data of last two flights that were conducted. The unit did not have internal data recording capabilities; it could only record on the external SD card that was set up and used by the pilot.



Figures 5 and 6: The EFIS unit (back and front) after it was removed from the cockpit.

1.12. Wreckage and Impact Information

1.12.1. The video footage downloaded from the close circuit television (CCTV) camera mounted on the roof of the clubhouse at Morningstar Airfield showed the aircraft as it climbed in a southerly direction after take-off from Runway 20. The footage showed the windssock indicating a strong headwind.

1.12.2. At approximately 250 AGL, the aircraft was observed executing a left turn, followed by a nose-down dive; it then disappeared from the CCTV coverage. It crashed on a bush-type terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road, approximately 150m south-east of Morningstar Airfield.



Figure 7: The still video footage showing the runway used (red arrow), aircraft in a climb (yellow circle) and the windsock indicating a strong headwind (yellow arrow).




Figure 8: The still video footage showing the aircraft executing a left turn (yellow circle).




Figure 9: The still video footage showing the aircraft in a nose-down attitude.

- 1.12.3. The aircraft was examined by the investigating team at the accident site; none of the components or flight controls was missing and no evidence of defective flight controls was observed. The aircraft's tail section showed compression marks due to rapid deceleration after impact with the tree. The estimated aircraft impact was 82° magnetic.
- 1.12.4. Evidence indicated that the aircraft was in a nose-down attitude and the flaps were retracted (up position) when it impacted the ground. Before impacting the ground, the right-wing root leading edge impacted the stem of a large tree which caused the wing tanks to rupture. The aircraft had an estimated Mogas of 57L in the tanks at the time of impact. There was a strong smell of fuel at the accident scene. The nose gear strut was found broken due to overload, and the spring-loaded main landing gear struts were stretched backward. The main wheel assemblies/tyres remained intact and inflated. The propeller had struck the soft ground and one of the blades had broken off. Examination of the remaining two composite blades indicated that the engine was not delivering power at the time of impact.



Figures 10 and 11: The aircraft's right-wing root against the tree stem.



Figures 12 and 13: The left wing with the flaps retracted (UP position) and the left main gear strut that has stretched backward. The engine nose section is buried under the soft ground, and the remaining two blades are still intact.

1.12.5. The engine was pushed back towards the firewall; the engine mounts and the firewall were severely damaged. External examination of the engine revealed a clean air filter; the exhaust system was damaged, but no anomalies were noted. The cooling system was intact. The oil reservoir cap was missing; however, there was oil spillage on the inside engine cowling, suggesting that it was not in place during impact. Examination of the cockpit area revealed that both control columns had broken off. The throttle lever was in a full forward position (maximum power), and the fuel selector in the middle console was selected to the right tank. The fuselage was severely damaged; therefore, functionality of the flight controls could not be fully assessed.

1.12.6. The EFIS screen was crushed and the SD card ejected. The circuit breakers (CBs) on the instrument panel were firmly secured to the mounting panel in the pressed (in) position, and all the switches including those of the fuel pumps were on.




Figure 14: An enlarged view of the EFIS (yellow arrow) unit in the cockpit with the switches in 'on' position.

1.13. Medical and Pathological Information

1.13.1. A post-mortem examination of the pilots was performed. At the time of the release of this report, the results of the post-mortem and the toxicology tests were not available. Should the results have substantive impact on the outcome of this investigation which may be considered as new evidence, the AIID will reopen the investigation.

1.14. Fire

1.14.1. There was no evidence of a pre- or post-impact fire.

1.15. Survival Aspects

1.15.1. The accident was not survivable due to high impact forces that compromised the structural integrity of the cockpit; this resulted in fatal injuries of the two pilots.

1.15.2. The aircraft was neither equipped with an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) nor was it required by regulation to be fitted to this aircraft.

1.16. Tests and Research

1.16.1. The weather condition at the time of the accident was not conducive to carburettor icing at take-off power settings.

1.16.2. The engine was found undamaged with the carburettors, exhaust and propeller still attached. The propeller was rotated by hand to establish continuity, and compression was noted in all four cylinders. The position of the fuel selector could not be determined because of the cockpit console area that was destroyed by impact forces. The position of the power lever (throttle) and mixture could not be determined. The fuel tanks ruptured during the accident sequence and the fuel that remained in the tanks leaked out. No fuel was available for testing. The carburettor float bowls were examined for condition. Both the carburettor float bowls were in good condition. Both carburettor float bowls were removed; water contamination and corrosion were found on the bottom of the float bowls.



Figures 15 and 16: The left side carburettor showing water contaminated in the float bowl (left picture). Corrosion at the bottom of the right carburettor float bowl (right picture).

1.16.3. The electronic box and ignition coils were visually examined and were of the correct type and appeared to be in good condition. The ignition cables (spark plug leads) were visually examined and found to be of the correct type and in good condition. The suppressor spark plug connectors (spark plug caps) were also examined and found to be of the correct type and in good condition. The spark plugs were removed and examined; the spark plugs were of the correct type and established a good burn pattern.

1.16.4. The EFIS SD card was recovered to the AMO at Morningstar Airfield for further investigation. The approved person (AP) rated on the aircraft type in the presence of the investigation team attempted to extract data from the SD card using a computer; however, the SD card did not contain data.

1.16.5. The engine was removed from the airframe and transported to a Rotax-approved maintenance facility at Wonderboom Airport (FAWB) in Gauteng province for further investigation. It was found that the fuel pump diaphragm and non-return valves were intact

and there was no debris on the magnetic plug. All the engine major components were intact. The investigation discovered water-contaminated fuel and corrosion in the carburettor float bowls which likely caused the engine to lose power during take-off from Runway 20.

1.17. Organisational and Management Information

1.17.1 The aircraft was operated under the provisions of Part 94 of the CAR 2011, as amended.

1.17.2 The aircraft was maintained by an AP with an AP Certificate that was issued by the Regulator (SACAA) on 4 December 2023 and expiring on 3 December 2025.

1.18 Additional Information

1.18.1 Flight Folio (Source: SACAA Regulations)

91.03.5 (1) *The owner or operator of a South African registered aircraft shall ensure that the aircraft carries a flight folio or any other similar document which meets the requirements of and contains the information as prescribed in Document SA-CATS 91, at all times.*

(2) *The flight folio shall be kept up-to-date and maintained in a legible manner by the PIC.*

(3) *All entries shall be made immediately upon completion of the occurrence to which they refer.*

(4) *In the case of maintenance being undertaken on the aircraft, the entry shall be certified by the person taking responsibility for the maintenance performed.*

(5) *The owner or operator shall retain the flight folio for a period of five years calculated from the date of the last entry therein.*

1.18.2. Fuel Record

91.03.6 (1) *The owner of operator of an aircraft shall maintain fuel records for each flight undertaken by the aircraft under the control of such owner or operator.*

(2) *The PIC of the aircraft shall enter the fuel and oil records referred to in sub-regulation (1) in the flight folio.*

1.18.3. Engine Failure After Take-off (Source: POH)

3.3.2 Engine failure immediately after take-off

1. Speed / trim - best glide speed (72 KIAS).
2. Find a suitable place on the ground to land safely. The landing should be planned straight ahead with only small changes in direction not exceeding 45 degrees to either side.
3. Flaps - as needed (plan to land as slowly as possible).

Before touch down

4. Magnetos / ignition - off
5. Master - off
6. Fuel selector valve - off
7. Electric fuel pump - off (912 ULS)
Electric fuel pumps (both) - off (914 UL / 912 iS)

<p>WARNING Flaps and elevator trim cannot operate without power on the main bus. Make final flap selection before turning master switch off.</p>

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1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

1.19.1 None.

2. ANALYSIS

2.1. General

From the available evidence, the following analysis was made with respect to this accident. This shall not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any organisation or individual.

2.2. Analysis

2.2.1. The pilot flying (PF) was initially issued a National Pilot Licence (NPL) on 10 December 2015 in accordance with (IAW) Part 61 of the CAR 2011. The licence was revalidated on 17 July 2025 with an expiry date of 14 July 2027. The pilot had the aircraft type (Sling 2 LSA) endorsed in his licence. The PF had a Class 4 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 6 September 2024 with an expiry date of 26 September 2026. The PF had a restriction to wear suitable corrective lenses for defective distant, intermediate and near vision.

- 2.2.2. The pilot monitoring (PM) was initially issued a Private Pilot Licence (PPL) on 24 July 2023 IAW Part 61 of the CAR 2011. The licence was revalidated on 16 July 2024 with an expiry date of 31 July 2026. The PM had the aircraft type (Sling 2 LSA) endorsed in his licence. The PM had a Class 2 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 25 February 2025 with an expiry date of 28 February 2030. The PM had no medical restrictions.
- 2.2.3. Post-accident investigation of the technical records indicated that the last 100-hour annual inspection of the aircraft was conducted by an approved person (AP) on 21 October 2025 at 639.0 total airframe hours. The AP who certified the last 100-hour inspection had an AP Certificate that was issued by the Regulator on 4 December 2023 with an expiry date of 3 December 2025. All the entries in the aircraft technical records were properly certified. Records indicated that the aircraft was certified and maintained IAW the existing regulations and maintenance programme. The last page of the aircraft flight folio with serial number 257217 had no evidence of fuel replenishment on 30 November 2025. (The flight that was conducted in the morning on the same day was also not recorded, which was in contravention of Part 91.03.5 [1] and Part 91.03.6 [1] of the South African Civil Aviation Regulations).
- 2.2.4. After the accident, the engine was removed from the airframe and transported to a Rotax-approved maintenance facility at FAWB in Gauteng province for further investigation. The fuel pump diaphragm and non-return valves were found intact and there was no debris on the magnetic plug. The investigation discovered water-contaminated fuel and corrosion in the carburettor float bowls which likely caused the engine to lose power during take-off from Runway 20.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1. General

From the available evidence, the following findings, causes and contributing factors were made with respect to this incident. These shall not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any organisation or individual.

To serve the objective of this investigation, the following sections are included in the conclusion heading:

- **Findings** — are statements of all significant conditions, events, or circumstances in this incident. The findings are significant steps in this incident sequence, but they are not always causal or indicate deficiencies.

- **Causes** — are actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which led to this incident.
- **Contributing factors** — are actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability of the incident occurring, or would have mitigated the severity of the consequences of the incident. The identification of contributing factors does not imply the assignment of fault or the determination of administrative, civil, or criminal liability.

3.2. Findings

- 3.2.1. The pilot flying (PF) had a National Pilot Licence (NPL) that was initially issued on 10 December 2015 in accordance with (IAW) Part 61 of the CAR 2011. The licence was revalidated on 17 July 2025 with an expiry date of 14 July 2027. The pilot had the aircraft type (Sling 2 LSA) endorsed in his licence.
- 3.2.2. The PF had a Class 4 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 6 September 2024 with an expiry date of 26 September 2026. The PF had a restriction to wear suitable corrective lenses for defective distant, intermediate and near vision.
- 3.2.3. The pilot monitoring (PM) had a Private Pilot Licence (PPL) that was initially issued on 24 July 2023 IAW Part 61 of the CAR 2011. The licence was revalidated on 16 July 2024 with an expiry date of 31 July 2026. The PM had the aircraft type (Sling 2 LSA) endorsed in his licence.
- 3.2.4. The PM had a Class 2 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 25 February 2025 with an expiry date of 28 February 2030. The PM had no medical restrictions.
- 3.2.5. The aircraft was issued a Certificate of Registration (C of R) on 28 June 2022 under the current owner.
- 3.2.6. The aircraft's Authority-to-Fly (ATF) Certificate was initially issued by the Regulator on 4 September 2019; the certificate was renewed on 24 November 2025 with an expiry date of 30 September 2026.
- 3.2.7. The last 100-hour annual inspection of the aircraft was conducted by the approved person (AP) on 21 October 2025 at 639.0 hours.
- 3.2.8. The Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) was issued on 21 October 2025 with an expiry date of 21 October 2026 or at 739.0 hours, whichever occurs first. The aircraft was flown for approximately 0.50 hours after the last inspection.
- 3.2.9. The AP who certified the last 100-hour inspection had an AP Certificate that was issued by the Regulator on 4 December 2023 with an expiry date of 3 December 2025.

3.3. Probable Cause

3.3.1 Loss of engine power during take-off from Runway 20 was likely caused by contaminated fuel and corrosion noted in the carburettor float bowls; the aircraft crashed on a bush-type terrain near Van Schoorsdrift Road, approximately 150m south-east of Morningstar Airfield.

3.4. Contributory Factors

3.4.1. Attempt to turn back to the departure Runway 20 instead of landing straight ahead.

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. General

The safety recommendations listed in this report are proposed according to paragraph 6.8 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and are based on the conclusions listed in heading 3 of this report. The AIID expects that all safety issues identified by the investigation are addressed by the receiving States and organisations.

4.2. Safety Recommendation/s

4.2.1. None.

5. APPENDICES

5.1. None.

This report is issued by:

Accident and Incident Investigations Division

South African Civil Aviation Authority

Republic of South Africa