



LIMITED OCCURRENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT – FINAL

Reference Number	CA18/3/2/1516						
Classification	Serious Incident	Date	24 November 2025		Time	1250Z	
Type of Operation	Air Transport Operations, Carriage of less than 20 passengers (Part 135)						
Location							
Place of Departure	Arathusa Safari Lodge Aerodrome (FAAR), Mpumalanga Province		Place of Intended Landing	O.R. Tambo International Airport (FAOR), Gauteng Province			
Place of Occurrence	On Runway 16 at Arathusa Safari Lodge Aerodrome, Mpumalanga Province						
GPS Co-ordinates	Latitude	24°44'11.68" S	Longitude	031°30'51.50" E	Elevation	1 256 feet	
Aircraft Information							
Registration	ZS-KMH and ZS-KMJ						
Make; Model; S/N	Cessna Aircraft Corporation, 208B Caravan (Serial Numbers: 208B-5742 [ZS-KMH] and 208B-5749 [ZS-KMJ])						
Damage to Aircraft	Substantial		Total Aircraft Hours	2 123.22			
Pilot-in-command							
Licence Type	Commercial Pilot Licence		Gender	Female		Age	26
Licence Valid	Yes	Total Hours	953.6		Total Hours on Type	651.6	
Total Hours 30 Days	46.7		Total Flying on Type Past 90 Days	140.2			
People on board	2 + 4	Injuries	0	Fatalities	0	Other (on ground)	0
What Happened							
<p>On Monday, 24 November 2025, a crew comprising two pilots and four passengers on-board a Cessna 208B Caravan aircraft registered ZS-KMH were conducting a non-scheduled commercial passenger flight from Arathusa Safari Lodge Aerodrome (FAAR) in Mpumalanga province to O.R. Tambo International Airport (FAOR) in Gauteng province. The flight was conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and under the provisions of Part 135 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, as amended.</p> <p>Before departure from FAAR, another aircraft registered ZS-KMJ, also a Cessna Caravan 208B, landed and parked on the apron area at a 45° angle to the runway centreline (see Figure 2). According to the ZS-KMH crew, the wind favoured Runway 16 for take-off. The captain (pilot-in-command [PIC]) who was seated in the left front seat verified that they were clear of the parked aircraft. The PIC also received a thumbs-up signal from the first officer (FO) of the parked aircraft (ZS-KMJ) who was on the ground and under the left wing of ZS-KMJ. However, the ZS-KMJ FO moved away from where he was standing due to the hazard associated with the propeller blast after power was applied by the ZS-KMH FO who was the pilot flying (PF) the sector. Whilst the PIC was reading the Before Take-off Checklist, they felt a noticeable bump (as if rolling over an obstacle such as a rock). The crew checked the main landing gear tyres on both sides (whilst on-board) and noted</p>							

no anomalies; thereafter, they continued with the take-off roll. After becoming airborne, the ZS-KMJ PIC informed the ZS-KMH crew via radio that their aircraft had impacted the left wing of their aircraft (ZS-KMJ). Because the ZS-KMH crew was unable to determine the extent of the potential damage to their wing, they made the decision to return to FAAR.

After landing back at FAAR, the ZS-KMH PIC briefed the passengers. Thereafter, the crew of both aircraft inspected their respective aircraft. The ZS-KMH had no significant damage (a scratch on the lower left-wing surface), whereas the upper wing surface of ZS-KMJ showed substantial damage. Both aircraft were then parked at the apron area and were tied down to a ground support cable (see Figures 3 and 4). No person was injured during the serious incident.



Figure 1: The position of the two aircraft when the wing impact occurred. (Source: Google Earth)



Figure 2: The ZS-KMJ aircraft as it was parked next to Runway 16 at the time. (Source: Operator)
The two arrows indicate the distance from the runway centreline to the runway edge which is 5m, and the wing exceeding the runway edge by 2.95m.



Figure 3: The threshold of Runway 16. The picture was taken after the serious incident with the two aircraft parked next to each other and tied down.



Figure 4: The water drainage ditch next to the runway edge apron area.




Figure 5: The contact mark that was observed on the lower wing surface of ZS-KMH.



Figure 6: The leading edge of the left wing of ZS-KMJ.




Figure 7: The damaged area on the top side of the ZS-KMJ wing.

NOTE: The wing measurements of the ZS-KMJ were as per the request of the aircraft manufacturer and were taken by an aircraft maintenance engineer (AME) at FAAR.

Aircraft Dimensions




Diagram 1: The wingspan of the Cessna 208B is 15.9m (52 feet and 1 inch), and the wheelbase is 3.55m (11 feet and 8 inches) (Source: Information Manual Cessna 208B, Section 1)

WEIGHT AND BALANCE REPORT



Figure 8: Weight and balance sheet of ZS-KMH. (Source: Operator)

Findings

1. Personnel

- 1.1 The pilot-in-command (PIC) of the ZS- KMH had a Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL) that was issued by the Regulator (SACAA) on 15 August 2019. Her total flying hours at the time of the serious incident were 953.6 of which 651.6 were on the aircraft type.
- 1.2 The PIC had a Class 1 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 21 July 2025 with an expiry date of 31 July 2026. The PIC had no medical restrictions on her medical certificate.
- 1.3 The first officer (FO) of the ZS-KMH had a Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL) that was issued by the Regulator on 28 May 2024. His total flying hours at the time of the serious incident were 684.5 hours of which 387.0 were on the aircraft type.

- 1.4 The FO had a Class 1 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 6 February 2025 with an expiry date of 28 February 2026. He had no restrictions on his medical certificate.
- 1.5 The FO was the pilot flying (PF) the sector and was seated in the right front seat.
- 1.6 The ZS-KMH PIC did not maintain visual reference outside the aircraft during the critical phase of the flight; she opted to read the Before Take-off Checklist instead.
- 1.7 The crew of the ZS-KMJ was properly licensed to perform the flight. The aircraft they were flying was parked at a 45° angle to the runway at the time. There was no person on-board the aircraft at the time of the serious incident.
- 1.8 The ZS-KMJ FO was on the ground assessing the wing clearances at the time ZS-KMH commenced with its take-off run; he gestured “thumbs up” to the crew that they had adequate wing-tip clearance before they commenced to move forward. The ZS-KMJ FO moved away when power was applied due to the hazard associated with the propeller blast.
- 1.9 The ZS-KMH crew was unaware that aircraft-to-aircraft contact had occurred during the take-off run; they were advised accordingly via radio by the ZS-KMJ PIC, whereafter, they returned to the aerodrome.

2. Aircraft

ZS-KMH

- 2.1 The last maintenance inspection of the ZS-KMH before the serious incident flight was certified on 23 October 2025 at 2 060.5 airframe hours. The aircraft had accrued 62.7 hours since the maintenance inspection.
- 2.2 The aircraft was initially issued a Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) on 30 August 2023 with an expiry date of 29 August 2026.
- 2.3 The aircraft was issued a Certificate of Registration (C of R) on 4 July 2023.
- 2.4 The aircraft Certificate of Release to Service was issued on 23 October 2025. The CRS lapses at 2 260.52 airframe hours or on 22 October 2026, whichever occurs first.
- 2.5 The aircraft’s maximum take-off weight (MTOW) is 3 900 kilograms (kg) (8 598 pounds). The aircraft was correctly loaded for the flight as per the weight and balance report received from the operator.

2.6 The lower outer surface of the left wing displayed minor damage associated with aircraft-to-aircraft contact.

ZS-KMJ

2.7 The aircraft was parked on the apron area with no intention of flight.

2.8 The left-wing upper surface of the aircraft sustained damage when the left wing of ZS-KMH struck it as it was moving forward on Runway 16 for take-off.

2.9 The damage to the wing of the aircraft required the replacement of the sheet metal on the surfaces of the leading edge and the upper wing. The structural integrity of the wing was not compromised.

3. Aerodrome (FAAR)

3.1 The aerodrome is unmanned and unlicensed. It has a single asphalt runway orientated 16/34; the runway is 1 140 metres (m) long and 10m wide. The apron area is approximately 60m in length and 22m in width, and forms part of the runway surface.

3.2 Figure 3 shows that the apron area forms part of Runway 16, with the threshold at the start of the asphalt surface.

3.3 The initial surface area to the right of Runway 16 is not level with the rest of the runway, and it appears as if a water drainage ditch is located next to the runway along the apron area (see Figure 4).

3.4 The aerodrome layout chart (see Figure 8) forms part of the trip kit that the operator makes available to crew for all the lodges and aerodromes to which they need to fly. With reference to the NOTES section on the chart, there is no mention of what is required when more than one aircraft operates from this aerodrome at any given time.

Federal Airlines Reference Material Only




Figure 9: The aerodrome layout chart as issued by the operator.

4. Operator

- 4.1 The operator was issued a Class II Air Service Licence on 8 October 2025 by the Department of Transport.
- 4.2 The operator had an Air Operator Certificate (AOC) that was issued by the Regulator on 20 June 2025 with an expiry date of 30 June 2026 under the provisions of Part 135 of the CAR 2011, as amended.

4.3	Both aircraft were duly authorised according to the operations specification to operate under the AOC.
4.4	The four passengers who were on-board ZS-KMH were issued with tickets.

Probable Cause

The crew of ZS-KMH commenced their take-off roll from the threshold of Runway 16 without ensuring adequate wing-tip clearance between them and the parked ZS-KMJ aircraft. The lower left-wing surface of ZS-KMH impacted the upper left-wing surface of ZS-KMJ.

Contributing Factors

1. The ZS-KMH crew did not conduct a risk assessment before they commenced with their take-off run from a confined area (proximity to the parked ZS-KMJ).
2. The ZS-KMH crew did not take any evasive action by taxiing past the parked aircraft (to the right of the runway centreline) before commencing with their take-off run.
3. The ZS-KMH wings exceeded the runway edge by approximately 2.95m on either side (if the nose wheel of the aircraft was on the runway centreline during the take-off roll).
4. The ZS-KMH PIC did not maintain a constant lookout for any hazards during the critical phase of the flight and diverted her attention to reading the checklist.
5. The ZS-KMJ crew did not park the aircraft at a 90° angle to the runway centreline (see Figure 2), this presented inadequate wing-tip clearance as the aircraft was parked at a 45° angle to the runway centreline.
6. The operations manual of the operator does not address the parking layout to be complied with should more than one aircraft be operating from this aerodrome.
7. The ZS-KMH crew lacked familiarity with the aircraft's general dimensions.
8. The surface area to the right of Runway 16 has a water drainage ditch (see Figure 4) which poses a potential risk to the safe operation of aircraft in this area.

Safety Action(s)

None.

Safety Message and/or Safety Recommendations

1. It is recommended to the operator that if more than one aircraft is present at FAAR at any given time, both aircraft should be parked in a manner that ensures ample wing clearance is maintained to prevent a re-occurrence of this serious incident.

2. It is recommended to the operator that if more than one aircraft is present at FAAR, the crew that is going to take-off first should taxi past the parked aircraft safely onto the runway area, which should exclude the apron area as being part of the runway.
3. It is recommended to the aerodrome owner and the operator of the aircraft involved (in this serious incident) that Runway 16 threshold be moved, and that it should commence past the apron area as the current layout poses a serious safety risk.
4. It is recommended to the aerodrome owner that the water drainage ditch to the right of Runway 16 be levelled off to the runway surface as it poses a risk to safe operation of aircraft at the aerodrome.

About this Report

The decision to conduct a limited investigation is based on factors including whether the cause is known and the evidence supporting the cause is clear, the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation, and that will determine the scope of an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited investigation has been conducted, and the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) has relied on the information submitted by the affected person/s and organisation/s to compile this limited report. The report has been compiled using information supplied in the initial notification, as well as from follow-up desk top enquiries to bring awareness of potential safety issues to the industry in respect of this occurrence, as well as possible safety action/s that the industry might want to consider in preventing a recurrence of a similar occurrence.

All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.

Purpose

In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011 and ICAO Annex 13, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents, and not to apportion blame or liability.

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This report is issued by:

**Accident and Incident Investigations Division
South African Civil Aviation Authority
Republic of South Africa**