LIMITED OCCURRENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT – FINAL

Reference Number	CA18/3/2/1523						
Classification	Serious Incident	**Date**	25 January 2026		**Time**	1715Z	
Type of Operation	Private (Part 91)						
Location							
Place of Departure	Greater Kuduland Safaris Airstrip, Limpopo Province	Place of Intended Landing	Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (FAKN), Mpumalanga Province				
Place of Occurrence	On Runway 05 at Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport, Mpumalanga Province						
GPS Co-ordinates	Latitude	25° 22' 35.39" S	Longitude	31° 06' 12.00" E	Elevation	2 822 feet	
Aircraft Information							
Registration	ZS-OTP						
Make; Model; S/N	Beechcraft Super King Air; B200 (Serial Number: BB-683)						
Damage to Aircraft	Minor	Total Aircraft Hours	14 159.2				
Pilot-in-command							
Licence Type	Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL)	Gender	Male	Age	67		
Licence Valid	Yes	Total Hours	7 880.4	Total Hours on Type	780.4		
Total Hours 30 Days	31.4	Total Flying on Type Past 90 Days	18				
People On-board	1+9	**Injuries**	0	**Fatalities**	0	**Other (on ground)**	0

What Happened

On Sunday, 25 January 2026, a pilot and nine passengers on-board a Beechcraft Super King Air B200 aircraft with registration ZS-OTP departed on a private flight from Greater Kuduland Safaris (GKS) Airstrip near Tshipise, Limpopo province, to Kruger Mpumalanga International Airport (FAKN) in Mpumalanga province. The flight was conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) by day and under the provisions of Part 91 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, as amended.

According to the pilot, the flight from GKS to FAKN was uneventful. Upon arrival at FAKN, the prevailing weather conditions were fair; the aircraft was established on downwind for landing and the landing gear lever was selected to the down position and the main landing gear (MLG) down and locked indication green light illuminated but the status (indicator) of the nose gear did not illuminate. The pilot advised the air traffic control (ATC) officer about the anomaly and requested a low-level fly-past for visual inspection of the nose gear. The pilot flew two low-level passes near the control tower during which the ATC officer advised the pilot that the nose landing gear appeared to be partially extended. In co-ordination with the ATC officer, the pilot flew a holding pattern at a safe altitude west of Runway 05 whilst troubleshooting the landing gear malfunction. The applicable landing gear emergency procedure checklist was followed, including multiple attempts to recycle the landing gear

manually using the hand pump (manual gear extension system). After swapping the lights around, it was established that the landing gear indication light in the cockpit was serviceable; the pilot concluded that the nose landing gear was not down and locked. Due to the diminishing daylight, the pilot elected to land; he also requested, via the ATC, the service of emergency personnel to be on standby. The passengers were briefed about the nose gear anomaly prior to landing.

Touch down with the main landing gear was smooth; the pilot held off the aircraft's nose landing gear for as long as practicable. When the partially extended nose landing gear contacted the runway surface, the nose gear strut collapsed. The aircraft veered sharply to the left before it came to a full stop. The aircraft sustained minor damage; no person was injured.

Figure 1: The aircraft on the runway post-serious incident. (Source: Operator)

Landing Gear System Description (Source: Pilot's Operating Handbook [POH])

The Super King Air 200 landing gear system has a gearbox located below the cabin floor in the centre of the fuselage. The gearbox is operated by an electric motor which is controlled by the landing gear lever position. There are three outputs from the gearbox: spine drives attached to torque tubes which turn each main gear leg actuator, and a sprocket that drives a drive train turning the nose gear leg actuator. The electric motor has a dynamic brake system which is triggered by microswitches to prevent over-travel of the gear legs. The emergency extension system consists of a manually operated handle in the cockpit, turning a separate chain attached to the gearbox to drive all three gear legs down together.

Outcome of the Initial Investigation

After recovery, the aircraft was inspected by the operator's aircraft maintenance organisation (AMO) at FAKN. These were the following findings:

The floor panels in the main cabin were removed to establish the cause of the nose gear failure. It was noticed that the inner main nose drive train chain had snapped. It was further noticed that one of the links in the duplex chain on the extension cycle had also snapped with the link still laying under the floor panel. Various nose gear components were damaged during landing phase because of the partially extended nose gear.

Follow-up Investigation Findings

After the removal of the cabin floor panels to access the gearbox, it was evident that the nose gear chain had separated. The pins, plates and spring clip which made up the link had detached, but the parts were recovered inside the aircraft. The chain was visually inspected in accordance with the manufacturer's Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) and the general condition was within limits. A detailed inspection of the separated parts showed that one of the pins had fractured mid-point and half of the fractured pins were not recovered. The connecting plates were still in their original shape. It was also found that the chain had detached from one the sprockets and tensioners.

The airframe logbook was inspected and the record showed that the forward drive train was never changed since new. The landing gear inspection (overhaul) was completed on 26 November 2025 in accordance with CMM32-10-40, and it was found serviceable.

Figure 2: Damage to the duplex chain and the detached link on the floor panel (red arrow).
(Source: Aerotech)



Figures 3 and 4: Damage to the nose gear actuator (left picture) and drag braces (right picture). (Source: Aerotech)



Diagram 1: Schematic of the nose gear. (Source: Beechcraft B200 Manual)

Findings

1. Pilot

1.1. The pilot had a Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL) that was initially issued by the Regulator (SACAA) on 31 June 1996. The CPL was renewed on 4 November 2025 with an expiry date of 31 October 2026.

1.2. The pilot had a Class 1 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 22 August 2025 with an expiry date of 28 February 2026 with restrictions.

1.3 The pilot had a total of 7 880.4 flying hours of which 780.4 were accumulated on the aircraft type. The aircraft type was endorsed in the pilot's licence.

2. Aircraft

2.1 The last maintenance inspection (phase 1 and 2) of the aircraft was conducted and certified on 8 August 2025 at 14 074.5 total airframe hours after which a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) was issued with an expiry date of 12 August 2026 or at 14 274.5 airframe hours, whichever comes first. The aircraft had accrued 84.7 hours since the last maintenance inspection.

2.2 Maintenance of the aircraft was conducted by an approved AMO which had a valid AMO Certificate that was issued by the Regulator on 23 September 2025 with an expiry date of 30 September 2026.

2.3 The aircraft had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) that was first issued by the Regulator on 25 June 2015. The latest C of A had an expiry date of 30 June 2026. The aircraft was deemed airworthy when it was dispatched for the flight.

2.4 The Certificate of Registration (C of R) was issued to the present owner on 6 June 2017.

2.5 The landing gear should have six yearly/8000 cycles inspection intervals. The ZS-OTP had 13 171 cycles at the time of inspection. The inspection was completed on 26 November 2025 in accordance with CMM32-10-40 and it was found serviceable.

2.6 The AMO found that the nose gear duplex drive chain had never been changed. The manufacturer indicated that the life span of the chain is an on-condition item that can be replaced or changed if it is deemed to be below satisfactory condition.

Probable Cause(s)
The aircraft's nose gear collapsed during landing due to failure to lock into down position because it was partially extended.
Contributing Factor(s)
The nose gear drive train separated during undercarriage extension.
Safety Action(s)
None.
Safety Message and/or Safety Recommendation/s
None.
About this Report
The decision to conduct a limited investigation is based on factors including whether the cause is known and the evidence supporting the cause is clear, the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation and that will determine the scope of an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited investigation has been conducted, and the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) has relied on the information submitted by the affected person/s and organisation/s to compile this limited report. The report has been compiled using information supplied in the initial notification, as well as from follow-up desk top enquiries to bring awareness of potential safety issues to the industry in respect of this occurrence, as well as possible safety action/s that the industry might want to consider in preventing a recurrence of a similar occurrence. *All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.*
Purpose
In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011 and ICAO Annex 13, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.
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This report is issued by:

Accident and Incident Investigations Division
South African Civil Aviation Authority
Republic of South Africa