

AIRCRAFT SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

				Reference:		CA18/3/2/1532	
Aircraft Registration	ZS-CHL	Date of Incident	12 February 2026		Time of Incident	0650Z	
Type of Aircraft	Beechcraft Baron 58		Type of Operation		Type Private (Part 91)		
Pilot-in-command Licence Type	Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL)		Age	60	Licence Valid	Yes	
Pilot-in-command Flying Experience	Total Flying Hours		7 571.6		Hours on Type	404.2	
Last Point of Departure	Lanseria International Airport (FALA), Gauteng Province						
Next Point of Intended Landing	Wonderboom Airport (FAWB), Gauteng Province						
Damage to Aircraft	Substantial						
Location of the incident site with reference to easily defined geographical points (GPS readings if possible)							
Wonderboom Airport Runway 11, at Global Positioning System co-ordinates: 25°39'12.28" South 28°12'58.36" East							
Meteorological Information	Wind direction: 320°; Wind speed: 1 kts; Temperature: 29°C; Dew point: 10°C; QNH: 1015 hPa						
Number of People On-board	1+0	Number of People Injured	0	Number of People Killed	0	Other (On Ground)	0
Synopsis							
On Thursday morning, 12 February 2026 at 0600Z, a pilot on-board a Beechcraft Baron 58 aircraft registered ZS-CHL took off on a private flight from Lanseria International Airport (FALA) in Gauteng province to Wonderboom Airport (FAWB) in the same province. The pilot had intended to fly an extended route over Rustenburg because the engines were recently overhauled and needed to be mechanically run in. Take-off was uneventful; the aircraft climbed to an altitude of 6 000 feet (ft). After approximately 10 minutes of flight time, the pilot noted that the right engine cylinder head temperature was fully deflected. Moreover, the left and right Ampere (A) gauges were at zero, and the left and right alternator lights were illuminated. Because of these instrument indication anomalies, the pilot opted to route directly to FAWB. Whilst on approach to FAWB, the pilot selected the landing gear down but the green light which indicates that all landing gears are down and locked did not illuminate. The pilot informed the air traffic control officer (ATCO) on duty at FAWB about the anomaly and requested clearance to climb to 7 000ft overhead FAWB to manually extend the landing gear. After manually extending the landing gear, he requested permission to perform a fly-past over the tower for the ATCO to visually confirm if the aircraft's landing gears were extended. After making visual contact with the aircraft, the ATCO confirmed that the aircraft's landing gears were extended before giving clearance to the pilot to land the aircraft on Runway (RWY) 11. During the landing roll, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft veered off to the right shoulder of the runway. Shortly thereafter, the left main landing gear and the nose landing gear collapsed. As a result, the propellers impacted the ground and the aircraft							

skidded on to the grass-covered terrain before it rested on the right side of RWY 11. The aircraft was substantially damaged; the pilot was not injured.

Probable Cause

Failure to complete the landing gear emergency extension procedure in full resulted in the landing gear extending but not locking into position; subsequently, it collapsed during the landing roll.

Contributory Factor

Dual failure of the voltage regulators and their associated fuse caused a loss of electrical power in-flight and the depletion of the battery. This meant that the landing gears could not be extended using the normal procedure and the pilot had no visual indication to confirm that the landing gears were down and locked.

SRP Date	14 July 2026	Publication Date	15 July 2026
----------	--------------	------------------	--------------

Occurrence Details

Reference Number	: CA/3/2/1532
Occurrence Category	: Serious Incident
Type of Operation	: Private (Part 91)
Name of Operator	: Tacet Holdings (PTY) Ltd
Aircraft Registration	: South African
Aircraft Make and Model	: Beechcraft Baron 58
Nationality	: South African
Registration	: ZS-CHL
Place	: Wonderboom Airport (FAWB), Gauteng Province
Date and Time	: 12 February 2026 at 0650Z
Injuries	: None
Damage	: Substantial

Purpose of the Investigation

In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.

All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.

Investigation Process

The Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) was notified of the occurrence on 12 February 2026 at 0730Z. The occurrence was classified or categorised as a serious incident according to the CAR 2011 Part 12 and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) STD Annex 13 definitions. The notification was sent to the State of Registry, Operator, and Design and Manufacturer in accordance with the CAR 2011 Part 12 and the ICAO Annex 13 Chapter 4. The States did not appoint an accredited representative and/or advisor. The investigators were dispatched to the serious incident site.

Notes:

- Whenever the following words are mentioned in this report, they shall mean the following:*
Serious Incident — this investigated serious incident
Aircraft — the Beechcraft Baron 58 Baron involved in this serious incident
Investigation — the investigation into the circumstances of this serious incident
Pilot — the pilot involved in this serious incident
Report — this serious incident report
- Photos and figures used in this report were taken from different sources and may have been adjusted from the original for the sole purpose of improving clarity of the report. Modifications to images used in this report were limited to cropping, magnification, file compression; or enhancement of colour, brightness, contrast; or addition of text boxes, arrows, or lines.*

Disclaimer

This report is produced without prejudice to the rights of the South African Civil Aviation Authority, which are reserved.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	1
Occurrence Details	3
Purpose of the Investigation	3
Investigation Process.....	3
Disclaimer	3
Contents Page	4
Abbreviations	5
1. FACTUAL INFORMATION	6
1.1. History of Flight	6
1.2. Injuries to Persons	7
1.3. Damage to Aircraft	7
1.4. Other Damage	8
1.5. Personnel Information	8
1.6. Aircraft Information.....	9
1.7. Meteorological Information	11
1.8. Aids to Navigation	11
1.9. Communication	12
1.10. Aerodrome Information	12
1.11. Flight Recorders.....	12
1.12. Wreckage and Impact Information.....	12
1.13. Medical and Pathological Information.....	13
1.14. Fire	13
1.15. Survival Aspects	13
1.16. Tests and Research.....	13
1.17. Organisational and Management Information	15
1.18. Additional Information	15
1.19. Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques.....	15
2. ANALYSIS	16
3. CONCLUSION	17
3.2. Findings	17
3.3. Probable Cause/s	18
3.4. Contributory Factor/s	18
4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS	18
5. APPENDICES.....	19

Abbreviation	Description
°	Degrees
°C	Degrees Celsius
AIID	Accident and Incident Investigations Division
A	Ampere
AMO	Aircraft Maintenance Organisation
ATCO	Air Traffic Control Officer
C of A	Certificate of Airworthiness
C of R	Certificate of Registration
CRS	Certificate of Release to Service
FALA	Lanseria International Airport
FAWB	Wonderboom Airport
ft	Feet
hPa	Hectopascal
kts	Knots
MPI	Mandatory Periodic Inspection
m	Metres
METAR	Meteorological Aerodrome Report
RWY	Runway
SACAA	South African Civil Aviation Authority
SAWS	South African Weather Service
SFP	Special Flight Permit
QNH	Altitude Above Mean Sea Level
Z	Zulu (Term for Universal Co-ordinated Time - Zero Hours Greenwich)

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1. History of Flight

- 1.1.1. On Thursday morning, 12 February 2026 at 0600Z, a pilot on-board a Beechcraft Baron 58 aircraft registered ZS-CHL took off on a private flight from Lanseria International Airport (FALA) in Gauteng province to Wonderboom Airport (FAWB) in the same province. The flight was conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and under the provisions of Part 91 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, as amended.
- 1.1.2. The pilot had intended to fly an extended route via Rustenburg before routing to FAWB to land; this was because the aircraft engines were overhauled and needed to be run in for efficiency. After approximately 10 minutes of flight time, the pilot noticed that the right engine cylinder head temperature gauge was at full deflection, and that the left and right Ampere (A) gauges were at zero with both the left and right alternator lights illuminated. Because of the anomaly of these instrument indications, the pilot opted to abandon the remainder of the extended flight route and, instead, headed to FAWB.
- 1.1.3. During approach to land at FAWB, the pilot selected the landing gear down, but the green light did not illuminate to indicate that all the landing gears were down and locked. The pilot informed the air traffic control officer (ATCO) on duty about the anomaly and requested clearance to climb to 7 000 feet (ft) overhead FAWB to manually extend the landing gears. The pilot extended the landing gears using the manual hand crank lever but still the green light did not illuminate to confirm that they were down and locked. The pilot then requested permission to fly-past the tower for the ATCO to visually confirm if the landing gears were extended. The ATCO approved the fly-past. After making visual contact with the aircraft, the ATCO confirmed that the landing gear was extended before giving clearance to the pilot to land the aircraft on Runway (RWY) 11.
- 1.1.4. The pilot landed the aircraft with the flaps selected to 10° and at a speed of approximately 70 knots (kts). During the landing roll, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft veered off to the right shoulder of the runway. Shortly thereafter, the left main landing gear and the nose landing gear collapsed. As a result, the propellers impacted the ground and the aircraft skidded on to the grass-covered terrain before it rested on the right side of RWY 11.
- 1.1.5. The flight was conducted under a Special Flight Permit (SFP), issued by the Regulator (SACAA) on 8 February 2026 with an expiry date of 24 February 2026. The permit was issued for the aircraft to be ferried to FAWB for maintenance because of an overdue mandatory periodic inspection (MPI).

1.2. Injuries to Persons

1.2.1. The pilot was not injured during the serious incident.

Injuries	Pilot	Crew	Pass.	Total On-board	Other
Fatal	-	-	-	-	-
Serious	-	-	-	-	-
Minor	-	-	-	-	-
None	1	-	-	1	-
Total	1	-	-	1	-

Note: Other means people on the ground.

1.3. Damage to Aircraft

1.3.1. The aircraft sustained substantial damage to the landing gear system components, landing gear doors, left and right engine propellers and underbelly skin.



Figure 1: The damaged landing gear doors and belly of the ZS-CHL aircraft.

1.4. Other Damage

1.4.1. None.

1.5. Personnel Information

Nationality	South African	Gender	Male	Age	60
Licence Type	Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL)				
Licence Valid	Yes	Type Endorsed	Yes		
Ratings	Test Pilot Rating (Class 2), Night Rating, Instrument Rating				
Medical Expiry Date	31 May 2026				
Restrictions	VML, SSL				
Previous Incident	None				

Note: Previous incidents refer to past serious incidents the pilot was involved in, when relevant to this serious incident.

Flying Experience:

Total Hours	7571.6
Total Past 24 Hours	4.9
Total Past 7 Days	10.1
Total Past 90 Days	57.5
Total on Type Past 90 Days	0
Total on Type	404.2

1.5.1. The pilot had a valid Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL). He had a total of 404.2 hours on the aircraft type. Although the pilot had last flown the aircraft type on 3 June 2025 for 1.8 hours, he had flown other aircraft of the same class. The pilot had a valid medical certificate with an expiry date of 31 May 2026; he had the following restrictions on his medical certificate: Valid only with correction for defective distant, intermediate and near vision (VML); and annual hypertension protocol and lipogram (SSL).

1.5.2. Extract from the CAR 2011

91.02.4 (1) A pilot shall not act as PIC of an aircraft, or second-in-command (SIC) of an aircraft required to be crewed by more than one pilot, carrying passengers by day, unless such pilot has personally, within the 90 days immediately preceding the flight, carried out either by day or by night at least three take-offs and three landings in the same class or, if a type-rating is required, type or variant of aeroplane.

1.6. Aircraft Information

1.6.1. Aircraft Description (Source: Beechcraft Baron 58 Pilot Operating Handbook)

The Beechcraft Baron 58 is an all-metal, low-wing, twin engine monoplane with full retractable tricycle landing gear and a conventional horizontal and vertical stabilizer. It is a four to six seat airplane, with optional club seating configuration.



Figure 2: A depiction of a Beechcraft Baron 58. (Source: skiesmag.com)

Airframe:

Manufacturer/Model	Beechcraft/Baron 58	
Serial Number	TH-322	
Year of Manufacture	1973	
Total Airframe Hours (At Time of Serious incident)	6286.7	
Last Inspection (Date & Hours)	11 September 2024	6227.9
Hours Since Last MPI	58.8	
CRS Issue Date	11 September 2024	
C of A (Issue Date & Expiry Date)	13 March 1974	31 March 2026
C of R (Issue Date) (Present Owner)	10 November 2023	
Type of Fuel Used	AVGAS 100LL	
Operating Category	Private (Part 91)	
Previous Incidents	None	

Note: Previous incidents refer to past serious incidents the pilot was involved in, when relevant to this serious incident.

Engine: No.1

Manufacturer/Model	Continental IO520C
Serial Number	223217-73G
Part Number	IO520C

Hours Since New	6286.7
Hours Since Overhaul	0

Engine: No.2

Manufacturer/Model	Continental IO520C
Serial Number	223218-73C
Part Number	IO520C
Hours Since New	6286.7
Hours Since Overhaul	0

Propeller: No.1

Manufacturer/Model	Hartzell
Serial Number	ED2460
Part Number	PHC-J3YF-2UF
Hours Since New	Unknown
Hours Since Overhaul	305

Propeller: No.2

Manufacturer/Model	Hartzel
Serial Number	ED168
Part Number	PHC-J3YF-2UF
Hours Since New	Unknown
Hours Since Overhaul	203.1

- 1.6.2. Initial review of the aircraft's maintenance documentation indicated that the Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) had expired on 10 September 2025 during overhaul of the two engines.
- 1.6.3. The last 100-hour MPI of the aircraft was certified on 11 September 2024 at 6 227.9 total airframe hours with an expiry of 10 September 2025 or at 6327.9 total airframe hours, whichever comes first.
- 1.6.4. The aircraft Certificate of Registration (C of R) was issued to the current owner on 10 November 2023. The Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) was initially issued on 13 March 1974. The latest issued C of A had an expiry date of 31 March 2026.
- 1.6.5. The engines fitted to the aircraft were released to service after the overhaul on 28 January 2026; they were installed on the aircraft on 3 February 2026.
- 1.6.6. Baron 58 Electrical Power Generation (Source: Beech~ Baron 55 and 58 Maintenance Manual)

The Beechcraft Baron 58 generates electricity in-flight through two alternators that are controlled by two fully transistorised electronic voltage regulators. Only one regulator is operable in the system at any one time. The remaining regulator is used as an alternate or standby unit. When switched into the circuit, either regulator will automatically adjust the alternator output to the required electrical load, including battery recharging. Control and selection of the regulators is provided by a two-position selector switch, labelled VOLT REG-1-2, located on the pilot's subpanel.

1.6.7. Landing Gear Rigging (Source: Beechcraft Baron 58 Maintenance Manual)

Connect main gear inboard door linkage, retract gear slowly and check for clearance between door linkage and root rib. Run gear to 314 down position and adjust to maintain ¼-inch minimum clearance between gear and inboard door with the slack removed from the door linkage. Continue this procedure until door closes tightly in both up and down positions. Adjust doors by varying the length of the push-pull linkage rods. Disconnect the rods at the clevis fitting to make this adjustment.

1.7. Meteorological Information

- 1.7.1. The weather information below was obtained from the Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) that was issued by the South African Weather Service (SAWS), recorded at FAWB on 12 February 2026 at 0700Z.

Wind Direction	320°	Wind Speed	1kt	Visibility	Not recorded
Temperature	29°C	Cloud Cover	Not recorded	Cloud Base	Not recorded
Dew Point	10°C	QNH	1015 hPa		

1.8. Aids to Navigation

- 1.8.1. The aircraft was equipped with the following navigational equipment as approved by the Regulator:

- Garmin GFC600 automatic flight control system GMC605, serial number 38H600267.
- Garmin GFC600 automatic flight control system servos GSA 87, serial numbers 4JM0011541, 4JM008907, 4JM008509 and 4JM008715.

- 1.8.2. There were no records indicating that the navigational equipment was unserviceable prior to the flight.

1.9. Communication

- 1.9.1. The aircraft was equipped with a standard communication system as approved by the Regulator. There were no recorded defects with the communication system prior to the flight.

1.10. Aerodrome Information

- 1.10.1. The aircraft took off from RWY 07 at FALA to FAWB and was cleared to land on RWY 11.

Aerodrome Location	FAWB, Gauteng Province
Aerodrome Status	Licensed
Aerodrome GPS co-ordinates	25°39'19.11"South 028°13'16.81"East
Aerodrome Elevation	4 095ft
Runway Headings	11/29 and 06/24
Dimensions of Runway Used	1828m x 30m
Heading of Runway Used	110°
Surface of Runway Used	Asphalt
Approach Facilities	VOR/DME and PAPI's
Radio Frequency	118.350-MHz

1.11. Flight Recorders

- 1.11.1. The aircraft was neither equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), nor was it required by regulation to be fitted to the aircraft type.

1.12. Wreckage and Impact Information

- 1.12.1. The pilot performed a normal landing on RWY 11 at FAWB. During the landing roll, the right main landing gear collapsed, which caused the aircraft to veer off to the right. Shortly thereafter, the left main landing gear and nose landing gear collapsed, and the aircraft came to rest on its belly next to the runway.

1.12.2. A review of the aircraft after the serious incident revealed the following:

- 1.12.2.1 Damage to the main landing gear inboard doors and nose landing gear doors indicated that the landing gear doors were selected to open position when the landing gears collapsed (see Figure 1).



Figure 3: The aircraft resting on its belly after the serious incident. (Source: AMO)

1.13. Medical and Pathological Information

1.13.1. Not applicable.

1.14. Fire

1.14.1. There was no pre- or post-impact fire.

1.15. Survival Aspects

1.15.1. No person was injured during the serious incident.

1.16. Tests and Research

1.16.1. The aircraft's in-flight electrical power generation system was tested by suitably qualified aircraft maintenance technicians at an approved aircraft maintenance organisation (AMO) on 16 February 2026. The following items were assessed:

- The two Electro Systems alternators with serial numbers B060573 and 4111014 that were fitted to the aircraft engines were tested, and both were found to be serviceable.
- The two voltage regulators fitted to the aircraft were tested and found to be unserviceable. It was suspected that the glass tube fuse between the regulators and alternator made contact intermittently, and a resultant power surge damaged the voltage regulators when circuit was switched. This would have prevented charging of the aircraft's battery.

1.16.2. When the aircraft's power was switched on, the cylinder temperature gauge moved to full deflection. Troubleshooting of the gauge and probe revealed that the temperature probe had failed.



Figure 4: The engine's right-side cylinder head temperature gauge at full deflection with the engine off.

1.16.3. The landing gear gearbox, used to extend and retract the gear manually, was opened and examined. The manual extension crank handle and worm gear operated normally. The gearbox contained sufficient contaminant-free oil. However, the sector gear had not reached its full travel limit; eight teeth of travel remained, equating to approximately eight rotations of the crank handle. This is an indication that the manual extension procedure was not completed in full.




Figure 5: Inspection of the landing gear gearbox of the ZS-CHL aircraft.

1.17. Organisational and Management Information

1.17.1. The aircraft is owned by Tacet Holdings (Pty) Ltd, and it was operated by KZN Aviation (Pty) Ltd at the time of the serious incident. The aircraft was listed on the operations specifications of KZN Aviation (Pty) Ltd on 10 October 2025, and valid until 30 September 2026.

1.17.2. The AMO which completed the overhaul of the aircraft engines had a valid AMO Certificate that was issued by the Regulator on 30 May 2025 with an expiry date of 31 May 2026.

1.17.3. The AMO that installed the engines had a valid AMO Certificate that was issued by the Regulator on 28 February 2025 with an expiry date of 27 February 2026.

1.18. Additional Information

1.18.1. None.

1.19. Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques

1.19.1. None.

2. ANALYSIS

2.1. General

From the available evidence, the following analysis was made with respect to this incident. This shall not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any organisation or individual.

2.2. Analysis

2.2.1. Pilot

2.2.1.1. The pilot was appropriately licensed and medically fit to operate the aircraft. He had a valid Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL), issued on 11 April 2025 and expiring on 31 May 2026. His credentials included instrument rating, night rating and test pilot (Class 2) rating.

2.2.1.2. The pilot was medically fit; he had a Class 1 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 20 November 2025 with and expiry date of 31 May 2026.

2.2.2. Aircraft

2.2.2.1. A review of the maintenance records made available to the investigator indicated that the CRS had expired on 10 September 2025. The aircraft was undergoing maintenance at the time the CRS expired and was in the process of being relocated to FAWB to conduct an overdue MPI.

2.2.2.2. Assessment of the aircraft's electrical system revealed that both voltage regulators were blown. This would have prevented the battery from charging in-flight and, eventually, lead to its depletion. The loss of electrical power supply prevented the pilot from extending the landing gear fully when using the normal procedure as the electrical motor used for the electro-mechanical extension of the landing gears and the green light used to indicate landing gear down and locked position were not operating.

2.2.2.3. Assessment of the landing gear gearbox revealed that the sector gear did not reach the internal travel stop. This indicated that the manual extension procedure was not carried out to completion and prevented the landing gear from locking into position.

2.2.2.4. Damage to the main landing gear doors indicated that the doors were open when the landing gears collapsed. The open landing gear doors indicated that the manual extension procedure had not been completed in full.

2.2.3. Environment

- 2.2.3.1. Good weather conditions prevailed at the time of the flight; the weather did not contribute to the cause of this serious incident.

3. CONCLUSION

3.1. General

From the available evidence, the following findings, causes and contributing factors were made with respect to this serious incident. These shall not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any organisation or individual.

To serve the objective of this investigation, the following sections are included in the conclusion heading:

- **Findings** — are statements of all significant conditions, events, or circumstances in this serious incident. The findings are significant steps in this serious incident sequence, but they are not always causal or indicate deficiencies.
- **Causes** — are actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which led to this incident.
- **Contributing factors** — are actions, omissions, events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which, if eliminated, avoided or absent, would have reduced the probability of the incident occurring, or would have mitigated the severity of the consequences of the incident. The identification of contributing factors does not imply the assignment of fault or the determination of administrative, civil, or criminal liability.

3.2. Findings

- 3.2.1. The pilot had a valid Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL). He had a total of 404.2 hours on the aircraft type. The pilot also had a valid medical certificate with an expiry date of 31 May 2026.
- 3.2.2. The aircraft had a valid Certificate of Registration (C of R) that was issued to the current owner on 10 November 2023. The Certificate of Airworthiness (C of A) was initially issued on 13 March 1974. The latest C of A had an expiry date of 31 March 2026.
- 3.2.3. A review of the aircraft's maintenance documentation showed that maintenance schedule was not up to date and that the Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) had expired on 10 September 2025. The aircraft was, however, undergoing maintenance at the time of the CRS expiration, and the accident flight was intended for the aircraft to be relocated to FAWB for the overdue MPI to be conducted.

- 3.2.4. At the time of the serious incident, the flight was conducted under a Special Flight Permit (SFP) that was issued by the Regulator. The aircraft was flown under visual flight rules by day in accordance with Part 91 of the CAR 2011.
- 3.2.5. The failure of the voltage regulators in-flight resulted in the aircraft battery not charging and, eventually, depleting. The loss of electrical power prevented normal landing gear extension and operation of the gear down-and-locked indication.
- 3.2.6. Failure to fully complete the manual landing gear extension procedure resulted in the landing gear extending but failing to lock into position. Consequently, the landing gear collapsed during the landing roll.
- 3.2.7. Good weather conditions prevailed on the day of the flight; the weather did not contribute to the cause of the serious incident.

3.3. Probable Cause/s

- 3.3.1. Failure to complete the landing gear emergency extension procedure in full resulted in the landing gear being extended but not locked into position; subsequently, it collapsed during the landing roll.

3.4. Contributory Factor/s

- 3.4.1. Dual failure of the voltage regulators and their associated fuse caused a loss of electrical power in-flight and the depletion of the battery. This meant that the landing gears could not be extended using the normal procedure and the pilot had no visual indication to confirm that the landing gears were down and locked.

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. General

The safety recommendations listed in this report are proposed according to paragraph 6.8 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and are based on the conclusions listed in heading 3 of this report. The AIID expects that all safety issues identified by the investigation are addressed by the receiving States and organisations.

4.2. Safety Recommendation/s

4.2.1. None.

5. APPENDICES

5.1. None.

This report is issued by:

**Accident and Incident Investigations Division
South African Civil Aviation Authority
Republic of South Africa**