



LIMITED OCCURRENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT – FINAL

Reference Number	CA18/3/2/1540						
Classification	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 25%;">Serious Incident</td> <td style="width: 15%;">Date</td> <td style="width: 35%;">13 March 2026</td> <td style="width: 15%;">Time</td> <td style="width: 10%;">0750Z</td> </tr> </table>	Serious Incident	Date	13 March 2026	Time	0750Z	
Serious Incident	Date	13 March 2026	Time	0750Z			
Type of Operation	Private (Part 94)						
Location							
Place of Departure	Morningstar Airfield, Western Cape Province		Place of Intended Landing	Doringbaai Airstrip, Northern Cape Province			
Place of Occurrence	At the end of Runway 18 at Doringbaai Airstrip (FASB), Northern Cape Province						
GPS Co-ordinates	Latitude	31°48'37.14" S	Longitude	18°14'23.86" E	Elevation	92ft	
Aircraft Information							
Registration	ZU-CIT						
Make; Model; S/N	Shadow Lite, Jabiru SP 470 (Serial Number: 435)						
Damage to Aircraft	Substantial			Total Aircraft Hours	676.4		
Pilot-in-command							
Licence Type	Private Pilot Licence (PPL)		Gender	Female		Age	52
Licence Valid	Yes	Total Hours	107.8		Total Hours on Type	13	
Total Hours 30 Days	5.0		Total Flying on Type Past 90 Days	11.9			
People On-board	1+0	Injuries	0	Fatalities	0	Other (on ground)	0
What Happened							
<p>On Friday morning, 13 March 2026, a pilot on-board a Jabiru SP 470 aircraft registered ZU-CIT took off on a private flight from Morningstar Airfield in Western Cape province to Doringbaai Airstrip for refuelling, before routing to Springbok Aerodrome (FASB) in Northern Cape province. The flight was conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and under the provisions of Part 94 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, as amended.</p> <p>The pilot reported that a pre-flight inspection was conducted during which no anomalies were identified. The aircraft had approximately 65 litres of Avgas 100LL prior to departure. At 0445Z, the aircraft took off from Morningstar Airfield and climbed to 3 500 feet (ft), maintaining a cruise speed of 95 knots (kts). The phase of the flight from Morningstar Airfield to Doringbaai Airstrip was uneventful.</p> <p>Upon reaching Doringbaai Airstrip during approach to land on Runway 18 (gravel runway) which is 1 000 metres (m) long, the pilot configured the aircraft by selecting flaps to 2° at an indicated speed</p>							

of 65kts. The aircraft floated above the runway before it touched down deep, about two-thirds of the runway.




Figure 1: Floating during landing. (Source: Airplane Flying Handbook [3] Chapter 9)

The pilot could not bring the aircraft to a stop on the remainder of the runway. Therefore, the aircraft overran the runway and careered into the bush beyond the boundary. Subsequently, the nose wheel assembly collapsed and the aircraft pitched forward, resulting in the propeller strikes on the ground. The aircraft came to rest on a bushy terrain approximately 5m beyond the end of Runway 18, settling to a level attitude. The aircraft was substantially damaged; the pilot was not injured.

The serious incident occurred during daylight approximately 5m beyond the end of Runway 18 at Doringbaai Airstrip at Global Positioning System (GPS) co-ordinates determined to be 31°48'37.14" South 18°14'23.86 East, at an elevation of 92 feet (ft).




Figure 2: The approximate location of the serious incident. (Source: Google Earth)



Figure 3: The aircraft at the serious incident site. (Source: Pilot)

Post-serious Incident

An operationality test of the aircraft's braking system was conducted in accordance with the standard procedures. The system functioned as intended and no anomalies or defects were identified. All tested components were found to be serviceable.

The investigation determined that the available runway length was 1 000m. The Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) indicated that the required landing distance with full flaps configuration under normal operating conditions was between 412m and 577m at an approach speed of 57kts. The runway surface was bumpy (gravel surface) and this reduced the braking effectiveness and increased the landing roll due to decreased tyre-to-surface contact and variable surface friction.

Meteorological Information

The weather information presented in the table below was sourced from the Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) that was issued by the South African Weather Service for FASB on 13 March 2026 at 0800Z.

Wind Direction	360°	Wind Speed	08kt	Visibility	9999m
Temperature	31°C	Cloud Cover	Nil	Cloud Base	Nil
Dew Point	4°C	QNH	1019 hPa		




Figure 4: The calculated tailwind component is 08kts. (Source: <https://e6bx.com>)

The tailwind component at the time of landing was recorded as 8kts. This increased the aircraft's groundspeed during approach and landing phases which resulted in an increased landing distance compared to an environment in which there was calm wind or headwind.

The Jabiru Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) states:

"Do not attempt to land with a tail-wind component."

Standard Unmanned Aerodrome Joining Procedure (Source: Aeronautical Information Publication - AIP)

When arriving at an aerodrome where no air traffic control (ATC) service is provided, the pilot shall:

- *Maintain a listening watch and make blind broadcasts as appropriate.*
- *Join overhead the aerodrome at a height of 2 000ft to determine runway in use.*
- *Observe the traffic pattern while overhead.*
- *Descend on the non-active (dead) side of the circuit.*
- *Join the circuit on the crosswind or downwind leg at circuit altitude.*
- *Continue standard circuit and land in accordance with normal procedures.*
- *Make appropriate broadcasts throughout the circuit.*

Findings

1. The pilot had a Private Pilot Licence (PPL) that was initially issued by the Regulator (SACAA) on 7 April 2025. The licence was reissued on 19 January 2026 with an expiry date of 28 February 2028.

2. The pilot had a Class 2 aviation medical certificate that was issued on 15 July 2025 with an expiry date of 31 July 2026.
3. The pilot had a total of 13 flying hours accumulated on the aircraft type. The aircraft type was endorsed in her licence.
4. The aircraft was registered to the current owner on 30 April 2025.
5. The last 100-hour annual inspection of the aircraft was conducted and certified on 2 February 2026 at 667.60 total airframe hours after which a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) was issued with an expiry date of 1 February 2027 or at 767.60 hours, whichever comes first. The aircraft had accrued 8.8 hours since the last annual inspection.
6. The aircraft had an Authority-to-Fly (ATF) Certificate that was initially issued by the Regulator on 25 February 2011. The ATF was reissued on 10 April 2025 with an expiry date of 31 May 2026.
7. The pilot disregarded the unmanned joining procedure and selected an incorrect runway to land.
8. The aircraft's braking system was serviceable.
9. The aircraft landed deep on Runway 18 at a speed of 65kts instead of 57kts as per the Pilot's Operating Handbook.
10. The aircraft landed with a recorded tailwind component of 8kts. The POH prohibits tailwind landings. Touch down occurred beyond the normal touchdown zone with the aircraft crossing the threshold at an indicated airspeed of approximately 65kts, exceeding the recommended approach speed of 57kts as specified in the POH. This resulted in an extended landing distance.

Probable Cause

The tailwind caused the aircraft to touch down deep which led to a runway excursion into a bushy terrain.

Contributing Factors

1. Tailwind component.
2. Landing technique.
3. Failure to execute a go-around.

Safety Action(s)

None.

Safety Message and/or Safety Recommendation/s
None.
About this Report
<p><i>The decision to conduct a limited investigation is based on factors including whether the cause is known and the evidence supporting the cause is clear, the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation and that will determine the scope of an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited investigation has been conducted, and the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) has relied on the information submitted by the affected person/s and organisation/s to compile this limited report. The report has been compiled using information supplied in the initial notification, as well as from follow-up desk top enquiries to bring awareness of potential safety issues to the industry in respect of this occurrence, as well as possible safety action/s that the industry might want to consider in preventing a recurrence of a similar occurrence.</i></p> <p><i>All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.</i></p>
Purpose
<p><i>In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011 and ICAO Annex 13, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.</i></p>
Disclaimer
<p><i>This report is produced without prejudice to the rights of the AIID, which are reserved.</i></p>

This report is issued by:

**Accident and Incident Investigations Division
South African Civil Aviation Authority
Republic of South Africa**