LIMITED OCCURRENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT – FINAL

Reference Number	CA18/3/2/1544						
Classification	Serious Incident	**Date**	12 April 2026		**Time**	0725Z	
Type of Operation	Private (Part 94)						
Location							
Place of Departure	Morningstar Airfield, Western Cape Province	Place of Intended Landing	Diemerskraal Airfield, Western Cape Province				
Place of Occurrence	Right side of Runway 22 at Diemerskraal Airfield, Western Cape Province						
GPS Co-ordinates	Latitude	33°34'31.73"S	Longitude	18°54'59.98"E	Elevation	275 feet	
Aircraft Information							
Registration	ZU-CCG						
Make; Model; S/N	Bushbaby 450 (Serial Number: 049)						
Damage to Aircraft	Minor	Total Aircraft Hours	455.8				
Pilot-in-command							
Licence Type	National Pilot Licence (NPL)	Gender	Male	Age	53		
Licence Valid	Yes	Total Hours	407.3	Total Hours on Type	276.5		
Total Hours 30 Days	22	Total Flying on Type Past 90 Days	40.2				
People On-board	1+1	**Injuries**	0	**Fatalities**	0	**Other (on ground)**	0

What Happened

On Sunday morning, 12 April 2026, a pilot and a passenger on-board a Bushbaby 450 aircraft (taildragger) registered ZU-CCG took off on a private flight from Morningstar Airfield to Diemerskraal Airfield, both located in the Western Cape province. The flight was conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and under the provisions of Part 94 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, as amended.

According to the pilot, upon arrival at Diemerskraal Airfield, he performed an unmanned joining procedure and selected Runway (RWY) 22 for landing. The downwind leg and approach phases were uneventful. During touchdown at an estimated speed of about 48 miles per hour (mph) and whilst the tail was still in the air, the pilot reached down to manually retract the flaps. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft unexpectedly began to lose directional control, and it veered to the right of the runway. The pilot attempted to regain control by applying full left rudder and then the left brake; however, these efforts were unsuccessful. As the aircraft rolled onto the grass area alongside the runway, it ground-looped and came to a stop facing the runway at an angle. No person was injured during the serious incident. The aircraft sustained damage to the left main landing gear.

Figure 1: Aircraft came to rest on the right side of the runway. (Source: Owner)

Figure 2: The skid marks on the gravel runway veering to the right. (Source: Owner)

FACT 120700Z 20010KT 9999 FEW009 20/17 Q1018 NOSIG=

FACT 120730Z 19012KT 9999 FEW015 20/17 Q1018 NOSIG=

FACT 120800Z 19011KT 9999 FEW015 21/16 Q1018 NOSIG=

Figure 3: FACT weather at the time of the serious incident. (Source: SAWS)



Figure 4: Crosswind calculation. (Source: Source: https://e6bx.com/wind-components/)

SAFE AIRSPEED OPERATION



Description	Speed
Maximum Crosswind	18 mph
Take-Off Rotate	41 mph
Best Rate of Climb:	
• Flaps 0%	75 mph
• Flaps 10%	65 mph
Cruise Climb	80 mph
Turbulant Air Penetration	80 mph
Landing Approach:	
• Flaps 20% MAUW	60 mph
• Clean MAUW	70 mph
• Clean Solo	65 mph

Table 1: Bushbaby POH. (Source: Kit Planes for Africa)

Crosswind After-landing Roll (Source: FAA-H-8083-C)

Particularly during the after-landing roll, special attention should be given to maintaining directional control using rudder and tailwheel steering while keeping the upwind wing from rising using aileron. Characteristically, an airplane has a greater profile or side area behind the main landing gear than the forward of it. With the main wheels acting as a pivot point and the greater surface area exposed to the crosswind behind that pivot point, the airplane tends to turn or weathervane into the wind [Figure 5]. This weathervane tendency is more prevalent in the tailwheel-type because the airplane's surface area behind the main landing gear is greater than in nose-wheel-type airplanes.

Findings

1. Pilot

1.1. The pilot had a National Pilot Licence (NPL) that was initially issued on 22 October 2020. The NPL was renewed on 12 July 2025 with an expiry date of 11 July 2027.

1.2. The pilot had a Class 4 medical certificate that was issued on 15 August 2025 with an expiry date of 31 August 2026 with a special restriction.

2. Aircraft

2.1 The last maintenance inspection of the aircraft was conducted and certified by an approved aircraft maintenance organisation (AMO) on 13 January 2026 at 8 790 airframe hours. The aircraft was issued a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) with an expiry date of 12 January 2027 or

at 8 940 airframe hours, whichever comes first. The aircraft had accrued 70 hours since the last maintenance inspection.

2.2 The aircraft had a valid Authority-to-Fly (ATF) Certificate that was initially issued by the Regulator on 1 September 2011. The latest ATF Certificate was issued on 1 April 2026 with an expiry date of 17 April 2027. The aircraft was airworthy when it was dispatched for the flight.

2.3 The Certificate of Registration (C of R) was issued to the present owner on 15 December 2022.

2.4 The pilot stated that during the landing roll "while the tail section was still in the air, he reached down to manually retract the flap. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft unexpectedly began to lose directional control, and it veered to the right of the runway.

2.5 The manual retraction of flaps during the landing roll likely diverted the pilot's attention from maintaining directional control during the critical phase of flight when the tail section was still in the air.

Probable Cause(s)

The pilot lost control of the aircraft during the landing roll, which resulted in damage to the undercarriage.

Contributing Factor(s)

The pilot's attention was diverted during the critical phase of landing.

Safety Action(s)

None.

Safety Message and/or Safety Recommendation/s

None.

About this Report

The decision to conduct a limited investigation is based on factors including whether the cause is known and the evidence supporting the cause is clear, the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation and that will determine the scope of an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited investigation has been conducted, and the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) has relied on the information submitted by the affected person/s and organisation/s to compile this limited report. The report has been compiled using information supplied in the initial notification, as well as from follow-up desk top enquiries to bring awareness of potential safety issues to the industry in respect of this occurrence, as well as possible safety action/s that the industry might want to consider in preventing a recurrence of a similar occurrence.

All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.

Purpose

In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011 and ICAO Annex 13, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.

Disclaimer
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This report is issued by:

Accident and Incident Investigations Division
South African Civil Aviation Authority
Republic of South Africa