



Section/division **Accident and Incident Investigations Division**

Form Number: CA 12-57

LIMITED OCCURRENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT – FINAL

Reference Number	CA18/3/2/1547						
Classification	Serious Incident		Date	06 May 2026		Time	0829Z
Type of Operation	Training (Part 141)						
Location							
Place of Departure	Virginia Airport (FAVG), KwaZulu-Natal Province		Place of Intended Landing		Virginia Airport (FAVG), KwaZulu-Natal Province		
Place of Occurrence	On Runway 05 at Virginia Airport (FAVG), KwaZulu-Natal Province						
GPS Co-ordinates	Latitude	29° 46' 22.12" S	Longitude	31° 03' 29.42" E	Elevation	39ft	
Aircraft Information							
Registration	ZU-STA						
Make; Model; S/N	Sling 2 (Serial Number: 242)						
Damage to Aircraft	Substantial			Total Aircraft Hours	3 932.9		
Pilot-in-command							
Licence Type	Student Pilot Licence (SPL)		Gender	Male		Age	43
Licence Valid	Yes	Total Hours	63.8		Total Hours on Type	63.8	
Total Hours 30 Days	4.8		Total Flying on Type Past 90 Days			20	
People On-board	1+0	Injuries	0	Fatalities	0	Other (on ground)	0
What Happened							
On Wednesday morning, 6 May 2026, a student pilot (SP) on-board a Sling 2 aircraft registered ZU-STA took off on a solo consolidation training flight from Virginia Airport (FAVG) in Durban, KwaZulu-Natal province, with the intention to land at the same airport. The flight was conducted under visual meteorological conditions (VMC) and under the provisions of Part 141 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011, as amended. The SP stated that he conducted a pre-flight inspection of the aircraft with no anomalies noted. Thereafter, he took off and routed to Blyde's Dale, Isithebe Aerodrome (FAIS), Mthunzini and back to FAVG. Upon his return, he joined downwind in preparation to land on Runway 05. He selected the third-stage flaps setting (full flaps) with the speed at 75 knots (kts) on final approach. After flying over Runway 05 threshold, the SP reduced the engine power; the aircraft landed hard with the main landing gears, and it bounced. Upon landing the second time, it bounced again; consequently, the nose landing gear strut collapsed, and the propeller struck the runway surface. The air traffic control officer (ATCO) activated the crash alarm and the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and the Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF) personnel swiftly responded to the scene.							

The aircraft sustained minor damage to the nose gear strut and the propeller. The SP disembarked from the aircraft uninjured.




Figure 1: The airport layout and the approximate area where the aircraft came to rest (yellow arrow).
(Source: Google Earth)



Figure 2: The aircraft on the runway after the serious incident. (Source: Pilot)

According to the aircraft Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), the following procedure is recommended for a normal landing:

Normal Landing

1. Airspeed @50ft 65 KIAS (65 kts)
2. Power IDLE IN GROUND EFFECT
3. Flare TO MINIMUM FLIGHT SPEED
4. Touchdown MAINS FIRST (*HOLD NOSE WHEEL OFF*)
5. Brakes APPLY AS NEEDED




Figure 3: Illustration of a bounce on the runway. (Source: FAA-H-8083-25B)

Bounce During Touchdown (Source: FAA-H-8083-25B)

When the airplane contacts the ground with a sharp impact as the result of an improper attitude or an excessive rate of sink, it tends to bounce back into the air. Though the airplane's tires and shock struts provide some springing action, the airplane does not bounce like a rubber ball. Instead, it rebounds into the air because the wing's angle of attack was abruptly increased, producing a sudden addition of lift. [Figure 3] The abrupt change in angle of attack is the result of inertia instantly forcing the airplane's tail downward when the main wheels contact the ground sharply. The severity of the bounce depends on the airspeed at the moment of contact and the degree to which the angle of attack or pitch attitude was increased. Since a bounce occurs when the airplane makes contact with the ground before the proper touchdown attitude is attained, it is almost invariably accompanied by the application of excessive back-elevator pressure. This is usually the result of the pilot realizing too late that the airplane is not in the proper attitude and attempting to establish it just as the second touchdown occurs. The corrective action for a bounce is the same as for ballooning and similarly

depends on its severity. When it is very slight and there is no extreme change in the airplane's pitch attitude, a follow-up landing may be executed by applying sufficient power to cushion the subsequent touchdown and smoothly adjusting the pitch to the proper touchdown attitude. In the event a very slight bounce is encountered while landing with a crosswind, crosswind correction must be maintained while the next touchdown is made. Remember that since the subsequent touchdown will be made at a slower airspeed, the upwind wing will have to be lowered even further to compensate for drift.

Extreme caution and alertness must be exercised anytime a bounce occurs, but particularly when there is a crosswind. Inexperienced pilots will almost invariably release the crosswind correction. When one main wheel of the airplane strikes the runway, the other wheel will touch down immediately afterwards, and the wings will become level. Then, with no crosswind correction as the airplane bounces, the wind will cause the airplane to roll with the wind, thus exposing even more surface to the crosswind and drifting the airplane more rapidly.

Findings

1. Pilot

- 1.1. The student pilot (SP) had a Student Pilot Licence (SPL) that was issued by the Regulator (SACAA) on 26 October 2023 with an expiry date of 10 June 2026. The SP's Class 2 aviation medical certificate was issued on 22 August 2025 with an expiry date of 31 August 2027.
- 1.2 The aircraft type was endorsed in the SP's licence. The SP had accumulated a total of 63.8 flying hours on the aircraft type.

2. Aircraft

- 2.1. The aircraft had an Authority-to-Fly (ATF) Certificate that was issued by the Regulator on 30 June 2025 with an expiry date of 30 June 2026. The aircraft was registered with the Regulator on 15 April 2019.
- 2.2. The last annual inspection of the aircraft was certified on 15 March 2026 at 3 846 total airframe hours with an expiry date of 15 March 2027 or at 3 960.8 hours, whichever comes first. The aircraft had a total of 3 932.9 hours at the time of the serious incident; it had accumulated a total of 86.9 hours since the last annual inspection.

2.3.	An approved person (AP) who conducted maintenance of the aircraft had an Approved Person Certificate that was issued on 6 February 2025 with an expiry date of 5 February 2027. The aircraft type was endorsed in the AP's maintenance specification certificate.
2.4.	The aircraft was serviceable before the flight, and no technical defects were reported before the serious incident.
2.5.	On final approach, the aircraft's speed was approximately 75 knots (kts), which exceeded the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) recommended normal landing speed of 65 kts.
2.6.	The flare was initiated higher than recommended, which resulted in a hard touch down and a bounce; after the second bounce the nose gear strut collapsed and the propeller struck the runway.
3.	<u>Environment</u>
3.1	Clear weather conditions prevailed at the time of the flight; the weather conditions did not contribute to this serious incident.
Probable Cause(s)	
Unstable approach due to high speed and an early flare resulted in the aircraft bouncing during touch down. Consequently, the nose gear strut collapsed, and the propeller struck the runway surface.	
Contributing Factor(s)	
Poor landing technique.	
Safety Action(s)	
None.	
Safety Message and/or Safety Recommendation/s	
None.	
About this Report	
<i>The decision to conduct a limited investigation is based on factors including whether the cause is known and the evidence supporting the cause is clear, the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation and that will determine the scope of an investigation. For this occurrence, a limited investigation has been conducted, and the Accident and Incident Investigations Division (AIID) has relied on the information submitted by the affected person/s and organisation/s to compile this limited report. The report has been compiled using information supplied in the initial notification, as well as from follow-up desktop enquiries to bring awareness of potential safety issues to the industry in respect of this occurrence, as well as possible safety action/s that the industry might want to consider in preventing a recurrence of a similar occurrence.</i> <i>All times given in this report are Co-ordinated Universal Time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus 2 hours.</i>	

Purpose
<i>In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 2011 and ICAO Annex 13, this report was compiled in the interest of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to apportion blame or liability.</i>
Disclaimer
<i>This report is produced without prejudice to the rights of the AIID, which are reserved.</i>

This report is issued by:

**Accident and Incident Investigations Division
South African Civil Aviation Authority
Republic of South Africa**